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All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action
for the sake of friendship.
John M acmurray, 
The S e lf as Agent
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INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to determine what contribution British philosopher John Macmurray 
makes to contemporary issues in education. Specifically, it seeks to determine how the 
philosophy o f personalism, a variant o f which Macmurray developed over more than fifty years 
of professional practice, informs our attempts to create nurturing learning environments.
Macmurray's work is rich in content and subtle in presentation. .Although he rarely wrote 
or spoke using only the technical language peculiar to philosophical discourse, his writings are 
textured and many-layered. They are accessible, but defy easy interpretation. Here is a 
presentation o f his philosophical position in as clear and simple a manner as possible for a non­
specialist. It is also an essay in the application o f this pedagogy to a real-life setting. The thesis 
also connects Macmurray's insights with those of contemporar}' philosopher of education 
Nel Noddings. The ethical system proposed for schooling by Noddings is not theistic. as is the 
model proposed by Macmurray, but in its clear emphasis on personal relations as essential to 
moral sense-making, it meshes and complements Macmurray's perspective. As a respected 
contemporary voice. Nel Noddings brings an awareness and engagement with present-day issues 
that did not need addressing when Macmurray was formulating his personalist stance.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter One, Wennington School: An Experiment in 
Personalist Education provides a thumbnail sketch o f Macmurray's personalism, and how these 
ideas were adopted by British schoolmaster Kenneth Barnes.
In Chapter Two, Personalism and the Postmodern Context, describes the encounter 
between a basically religious and personalist worldview, such as M acmurray's, with the 
secularizing influences o f postmodern thinking. It then goes on to recast Macmurray's 
personalism in a more contemporary stance by twinning it with the “pedagogy o f care" so well 
articulated by Nel Noddings. The first and second chapters are the core documents o f the thesis. 
Two attached appendices provide helpful details and useful contexts.
A thorough presentation of John Macmurray's personalist point o f view is found in 
Appendix A: Historical Sketch o f  a Personal Universe. The appendix provides an analysis o f 
M acmurray's historiography, in which, as a thoroughgoing humanist o f  the old school, 
Macmurray grounds his philosophy within a Christian reading o f  purposeful history. Appendix
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
B: Religion-as-Liberation, Society, and Community examines issues o f particular interest to 
Macmurray. This is done through reference to his own work, as well as to that of scholars who 
either based their views directly on Macmurray, or worked on identical themes along similar 
lines.
Macmurray, always a strong believer in the life of the mind, was nonetheless never 
seduced by the academy. He was far less interested in knowledge than in wisdom. "The 
philosopher,’’ he wrote at the height o f the Great Depression, “should reveal himself not as a 
specialist in a particular field but rather as one who has grasped the significance o f human life 
and achieved the ability, if not to live well, at least to understand how it should be lived” (1935. 
p.56). As a teacher o f adolescents, I can only hope that I shall have a small part in helping young 
persons come to such a conclusion by themselves.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Wennington School: An Experiment in Personalist Education
John's Macmurray’s philosophy o f  education is derived from his development o f a 
variety o f personalism, the perspective which he found most congenial to his purpose of 
interpreting the human experience through history. Simply put, Macmurray’s philosophy of 
education was founded on the rock o f “action,” as opposed to thought. Every person is an agent, 
naturally oriented toward action in a world populated by other human persons whose purposes, 
too, are directed by action. The aim of all action, Macmurray, argues, is to create or fashion the 
one value essential to human happiness and the creation o f a just society, “ friendship.”
This “friendship” is akin to the Christian concept o f philia, love o f one's fellow men. It 
is also connected to that other Christian concept, “agape,” or the love human persons have in. 
through, and for God. For John Macmurray, the life o f  the mind —  the intellectual adventure 
which has fascinated philosophers in the West since the Enlightenment — is, by itself, a selfish, 
egoistic, self-centered exercise which seriously misreads both the purpose o f the human person, 
and misunderstands the scope o f human action.
.A detailed background to the development o f M acmurray's philosophical position, his 
point o f  view, as he preferred to call it, is provided in Chapter Two on specific issues and, more 
comprehensively, in Appendix .A. Macmurray's reading o f what he considers the chief error of 
Western philosophy is there presented, along with a sketch o f his historiography.
In this chapter, the ideas which Macmurray developed over years o f professional writing 
within the academy, as well as his broadcast addresses on topical issues, form the background for 
an experiment in personalistic education. The Wennington School in England would be the 
setting for an attempt by admirers o f Macmurray’s pedagogy to apply his principles in practice.
Chapter Two provides a contemporary context in which M acmurray's personalist 
pedagogy can be updated and made relevant to present-day conditions. The Scottish moral 
philosopher’s work is integrated with, or grafted onto the approach promulgated by Nel 
Noddings, an American professor o f moral education. The twinning o f these two strands o f 
thought provides a rich context for schooling.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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The Biography of a Teacher
Macmurray’s childhood was one o f  ordinary domestic contentment, a conventional 
middle-class existence in a loving family strongly devoted to Christian principles. His use ot the 
family as the core theme for the ruling value o f friendship comes from this period. It helped 
create the mind which would later fashion a philosophy grounded in love, from which a 
pedagogy o f caring and affection could be extracted.
Although he would later turn against the religiosity o f his youth, the seriousness and 
sincerity with which religion was taken in his home inculcated in the young Macmurray a deep 
desire to help others, a sense o f duty and obligation. His focus was sharpened with involvement 
in the Student Christian Movement. He would seek an appointment to the mission fields of 
China, but his application would be refused because of concerns over his health.
Macmurray moved through several theological standpoints throughout his mature years, 
but he never rebelled against the fundamental teachings o f the Christian church. In youth he was 
loyal to his family allegiance to the presbyterian Church o f Scotland and. later, when his parents 
adopted a more evangelical form o f theology, John dutifully followed ( 1961. p.6). Calvinism 
presented him with an intellectual and emotional burden which he would later reject on well- 
articulated philosophical grounds. His unhappiness with the shadowing effects o f 
Presbyterianism is illustrated in an anecdote from Kenneth Barnes, later headmaster of 
Wennington School. Barnes writes in Energy Unbound: The Story o f  Wennington School how 
one day, in an uncharacteristic mood of depression, Macmurray said to Barnes: T f only I could 
get this incubus o f my back!’ ‘What incubus?' Barnes asked. ‘Calvinism,’ Macmurray replied 
(p. 27).
Macmurray entered Glasgow University in 1909, electing to read Classics but also 
finagling his way into geological studies, and winning the class medal in competition with 
students o f engineering and science. In Glasgow, he developed an interest in philosophy and 
pursued that line after winning a scholarship to Balliol College at Oxford. There he combined 
philosophical studies with Greats (Latin and Greek). After one year o f study, war was declared 
and Macmurray was faced with an important decision. He had embraced pacifism prior to the 
war and now found it impossible to enlist in the military as a fighting man. He initially
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
chose the Medical Corps but soon realized that this placed him every bit as much in a position 
o f responsibility as a fighter. Opting for what he considered a more honest decision, he enlisted 
in the Infantry and served with great distinction as an officer of the Queen's Own Cameron 
Highlanders. Wounded at Arras, Belgium, he was evacuated to Britain for hospitalization.
The opportunity to deliver a speech before a church congregation in London during his 
convalescence helped him decide that the core values o f Christianity had been compromised by 
bureaucratization and nationalization. In his address, Macmurray was bitterly critical o f the war 
boosterism and jingoism of the Christian churches. "I thought o f the churches as the various 
national religions o f Europe.'' he reports. His move away from membership in any Christian 
church was a declaration of independent thought. But this was done without a wholesale 
surrender to secularism. Macmurray remained a deeply spiritual person. Indeed, his stand 
against the conventional loyalties of so many o f his contemporaries was based on his own 
reading o f what a commitment to God could entail. As one sympathetic observ er has written.
For one who had thought at one time o f becoming a missionary, this was a grave decision, 
but it did give him an unusual degree o f intellectual freedom from institutional constraint 
in pursuing his philosophical reflection on religion. Whatever conclusions he might be 
led to. Macmurray was not likely to be open to the criticism o f simply offering a version 
of the traditional story (Duncan, 1990, p. 9).
From the late 1920's onwards, Macmurray devoted himself to an academic career in 
philosophy. He first taught at the University o f Manchester where he worked out detailed 
perspectives toward the philosophy of science, a subject that had long interested him. His 
approach included the idea o f the essential part that action plays in moral reasoning and 
reconsideration o f the idea o f certainty. Macmurray reached conclusions in this line o f thinking 
which Duncan (p. 11) believes are “strikingly similar” to those o f John Dewey, even then a 
leading light in the American movement for progressive education. [Dewey's conclusions were 
presented in the Gifford Lectures o f 1929; Macmurray's in the Gifford Lectures o f 1953-1954.]
In 1928, Macmurray was appointed to the Grote Chair o f  Philosophy in the University n f 
London. By now the main themes which would occupy him as a philosopher for the rest o f his
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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life were in place: the essential place o f the personal, the connections between knowledge and 
faith, the need for religion to become “experimental” (a Quaker term from the 17'^ century 
perhaps translatable today as “existential”), and the concept o f the self as an agent o f moral 
action.
At this point, Macmurray started his engagement with the public. He soon came to see 
that philosophy, his or that of any other thinker, was only as good or valid as the good which it 
could produce in real life. The young academic had always possessed a broad-streak o f Scottish 
good sense, and now it would be put to service by him in his capacity as a public intellectual.
The British Broadcasting Corporation asked Macmurray to deliver a series o f lectures on 
contemporary problems. The issues to be discussed would be the immediate ones so much 
preoccupying peoples' minds in 1930: unemployment, the contest o f ideologies —  Fascism and 
Communism —  being played out on the Continent, the contest o f science and religion, the place 
o f women in a new society; in other words, all the hallmark issues o f modernism.
Macmurray's easy manner, his presentation o f rigorous thinking in terms comprehensible 
to educated but non-specialist listeners proved a sensation. As Duncan ( 1990) points out. "The 
popular response to his talks may well suggest that Macmurray had a more accurate conception 
o f ‘ordinary language [philosophy]’ than many philosophers who have since talked a great deal 
about it but seldom in it” (p. 13). .Along with Bertram Russell's, Macmurray's work on the BBC 
helped shape his public image as an intelligent, incisive, and honest critic o f contemporary 
culture and issues.
One o f those influenced by both his scholarly and popular work was a young educator 
named Kenneth Barnes. The British schoolmaster would, in Macmurray's thought, “find a 
philosophy” for a new type o f school he wished to create. Although Macmurray never articulated 
a formal pedagogy based on his personalist insights, Bames had no doubt that many of 
M acmurray’s insights lent themselves ideally to the forming and sustaining o f learning 
communities. Macmurray had long enjoyed a certain status as a popularizer o f  philosophical 
reflection, a career not dissimilar to Bertram Russell’s. The Scottish intellectual had also 
frequently lectured tn working class social clubs and labor-oriented association. Barnes saw no 
reason why the general philosophical outlook which undergirded M acmurray's efforts at adult
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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education could not be applied to the more formal learning environment o f an English composite 
residential school.
Wennington School
The fourteen BBC broadcasts Macmurray produced between 1930 and 1932 were 
published by the corporation’s magazine, The Listener, and later produced as the book.
Freedom in the Modern World. It was this work which helped convince Bames that Macmurray's 
personalism held the key to formulating a philosophy for his educational project.
He was looking for a grounding philosophy which could combine the recognition o f the 
■manipulativeness' o f most contemporary' schooling with a broader view which would encourage 
students towards purposeful action within a 'convivial' environment. Bames would find that 
guiding philosophy in John M acmurray's work.
But what purpose does a philosophy. Macmurray's or anyone else's. serve? Macmurray. 
like any other thinker, has both positive and negative orientations in mind. There are things, 
movements, or ideas, to be opposed as well as ways to be charted. The following, taken from 
Freedom in the Modern World (1932, 1992), is a call to keep the connection between thinking 
and doing, reflection-as-action. Knowledge, he argues, has not value in and o f itself.
Now this particular unreality, mischievous and monstrous as it is, has been erected 
as an ideal for thought. It is the ideal o f knowledge for knowledge's sake. There is 
no significance whatever in knowing things just for the sake o f knowing them and 
nothing more. The search for knowledge is either the search for that which has a vital 
significance for human life or it is a relapse into unreality. 11% then have we come to 
regard knowledge as good in itself? I  shall tell you what I  believe to be the real reason. 
We are afraid o f  the terrible power o f  thought to change the world we live in, to destroy 
our illusions, to force us to alter our habits and our social arrangements. We hate to be 
disturbed and to have the fam iliar unreality o f  our ordinary existence and beliefs 
shattered. There is an enormous, savage weight o f  inertia in us. If you look back on 
history you will remember how society has set up barriers against the great thinkers and 
teachers to prevent their thoughts having any effect upon people's lives. In the old days it
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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was simpler to kill them outright. Nowadays we know a much better method. We do 
homage to thought. We make an ideal o f it (p. 93) [italics in original].
At this point in his intellectual development, Macmurray is analyzing at a highly 
developed level those values, personal and religious, which he is adopting from the Religious 
Society o f Friends. They are also directly connected to the pedagogical orientation Bames, 
himself a Quaker, is seeking for his school.
Wennington School will be designed to evince Macmurray’s ideals o f Personalism, the 
exploratory freedom urged by the new generation o f progressive thinkers in education, and 
the spiritual nurturing o f Quakerism. All this, too, will have to take place within a context of 
utter practicality mandated firstly by the nature o f  Quaker pedagogy, and secondly by the social 
conditions prevalent at the time of Wennington School's founding. The spiritual and intellectual 
foundations o f  Quakerism, particularly matters directly relevant to the management of school 
affairs such as decision-making, is taken up below.
A Headmaster's Personalism
Bames discusses Macmurray's ideas at length in a chapter entitled "Finding a 
Philosophy", in his account of his years as the sole schoolmaster of his community. Energy 
Unbound: The Story o f  Wennington School. He had, as the Quaker phrase has it, "felt a concern" 
in 1940 to open a school, this in the midst o f the Battle o f Britain. While German air force 
formations flew bombing missions over England, Bames. an experienced secondary school 
teacher o f science, was preparing an old manor house in the south o f England for its rebirth as a 
residential school managed along pedagogical lines informed by the personalism o f John 
Macmurray.
Bames and his wife, Frances, had been social activists throughout the Depression, 
working on employment programs, involved with refugee issues, and engaged in anti-Fascist 
work in the pre-war period. They were quite familiar with Macmurray's work as an intellectual 
supportive o f  progressive, nacifi.st, and Leftist, causes at the time. Like so many other educators 
strongly influenced by socialist and progressive ideals, Barnes's expressed the belief that their
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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chosen vocations as teachers offered the best opportunity for social betterment. In 1936, they 
published a manifesto entitled A Proposal fo r  a New School. One o f their stated aims was to 
“carry ‘progressive’ education further, to make it more relevant to the total social and political 
situation, to take independent education away from its exclusive association with the well-to-do.”
(p. 2).
Some of the Manifesto’s line reflect the spirit o f  Macmurray which informed the drafting 
o f the document:
some points at which might be laid, without violent upheaval, the foundations of 
a changed and just society within the scope o f the common people (based upon the 
convinced position that) the change to a new and just society will come only by 
the will o f the significant and producing masses o f mankind whose inheritance o f the 
world’s wealth is now largely withheld (p. 3).
The entrenched class system then prevalent in Britain was the main evil which this call 
for a new form of schooling meant to redress. Bames argued that only change based upon the 
individual person could alter socio-political realities in a meaningful way. Bames had also to 
contend with conflicts persisting between advocates o f private schooling and those urging that 
universal access meant exclusive state control. The bureaucratic wrangling is quite beside the 
point, says Bames.
But thought about education-in-community carries the argument beyond the deceptive 
state-versus-private conflict. All generalizations about what a category o f schools does 
are o f only temporary significance; we must pass beyond them to the more complex 
problem o f the relation o f a child to the community in which he grows up; otherwise 
all our changes will end with the same disillusionment. (Bames, 1980, p. 26)
Bames was determined to use M acmurray's personalism to create a model o f a school 
which could provide a uniformly high standard o f education to a community o f students recruited 
from all socio-economic groups. “We reminded ourselves that politics was for persons, not 
persons for politics.'’ (p. 4). A series of unexpected circumstances, serendipity, and good luck 
permitted Bames to occupy Wennington Hall, a manor house .near the Yorkshire border, which 
had been designated for use as a holiday resort but which, given the circumstances o f the war.
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was now available to the Quaker teachers for one pound’s rent. They arrived in August and 
planned to be open by September.
Teachers were recruited from amongst Quaker acquaintances. Some were experienced, 
most novices, many held advanced degrees in the arts or sciences. School policy stipulated that 
children would be admitted without regard to financial resources. Many children were recruited 
from among the populations being evacuated from Britain’s threatened cities to the countiy'side.
Financial equality was a principle among the teaching staff. Bames wanted all to share 
burdens equally, although talents might not be so neatly divided. For eight years all teachers 
earned the same salary until a policy change mandated the introduction o f the Bumham Scale 
Salaries (p. 7). Bames did not want a uniformity o f class membership. "We claimed to be a 
classless society and we took, with help o f local authorities, children whose parents could never 
have afforded the fees” (p. 75).
In writing the history o f his school decades later, Barnes reflects on Ivan Illich's 
understanding o f how schooling "invariably’’ takes on the aspect o f a manipulativeness which 
seeks to assure dominance and control, whatever the nature o f controlling political ideology, 
capitalist, socialist, communist. Bames does not view the treatment proposed by Illich, a process 
of "deschooling,’’ where the coercion is removed and “conviviality" installed, as reasonable, in 
the sense that it is attainable (p. 23). This kind o f convivial curriculum was likely just what the 
parents o f  children attending Wennington were seeking.
Few [parents] had boarding schools in their tradition. Most were reacting from the mass 
culture o f the large secondary school, from its impersonal and institutional treatment o f 
children, and they were seeking an education more personal, more inclusive, more 
practical, carried out in a social unit small enough for the child to comprehend 
and value (p. 75).
A pedagogy appropriate to such a search is found in John M acmurray's personalism; one 
which avoids the polarization o f attitudes by refocusing or re framing the argument. "His 
philosophy is for living, not mainly for thinking about thinking,” Bames writes (p. 23), 
commenting on the availability o f Macmurray’s thinking to ordinary persons. Not only does 
Macmurray’s personalism celebrate the being o f  person, it assumes that those creature who enjoy
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such being can understand its nature and their place in sharing it.
John Macmurray’s thinking, moving along completely different lines than those being 
followed by the overwhelming majority o f his professional colleagues, provided the right 
impetus for Wennington School. For while Bames appreciated some o f the work done by 
progressives like A.S. Neill, he worried about the tendency amongst such writers to allow for an 
untrammeled freedom. A freedom without limits could not serve the best interests o f the young, 
Bames believed, because it lacked discipline and focus. The key to an authentic pedagogy was 
Macmurray’s idea o f freedom-in-action, a freedom that exists because it is at the service o f 
others, a freedom that is authenticated through the real it)' o f friendship.
In John Macmurray we found a philosopher showing us what we were doing in the whole 
pattem of living activit)', saying that here was the primary focus to which everything else 
converged, from which every intention radiated (1980, p. 24).
M acmurray's emphasis on “friendship'’ is the royal road to moral agency, and 
"community" is the creation o f society based in friendship.
Bames is critical of the progressive education movement's emphasis on a notion of 
freedom which, he claims, lacks discipline and focus. He presents M acmurray's perspective as 
offering a more authentic understanding o f how human nature is expressed in action generated in 
spontaneous objectivity.
It is our nature to apprehend and enjoy a world that is outside ourselves, to live in 
communion with a world that is independent o f us. We are completely ourselves when 
we live in the full knowledge o f what is not ourselves. This is rational living —  whether 
it concerns thinking or feeling or simply doing (p. 25).
This sort o f language might be mistaken for a licence to riot if not placed in the proper 
context o f a learning community. Bames points out that Macmurray him self told him that 
“Discipline is the key to freedom." Bames realizes that some educators reject discipline 
altogether, trusting in a maturity which flowers naturally. Others believe the word "discipline" is 
too closely associated with “the old obedience concept,’’ an imposition o f authoritarianism. 
Bames recalls what Macmurray's teaching meant to him.
To us, what John Macmurray was urging was a sensitive adjustment o f our inner life
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and our actions to the objective nature o f the world and other people. It was not an effort 
to make other people fit into a pattem o f behaviour or morality that we thought good, nor 
a willingness to discipline ourselves to another person's pattem. It could be better 
compared to the discipline o f science. This is not a submissive discipline; it is a study o f 
how things really work and it confers on us a freedom —  one that has opened up 
incredibly in recent years —  to do what we want with material things (p. 26).
Bames is saying action through friendship produces goodness in a reliable and predictable 
manner, almost an objective manner. The theme of friendship is key for the life o f Wennington 
School. The nurture o f friendship "is the aim of all community life and the central aim o f true 
education. It makes possible the highest degree o f spontaneity, trust, and an intrepid spirit." (p. 
27). It also makes possible the elimination o f the greatest suffering a child can endure in school, 
he adds. "If you watch children, who express their basic needs more openly than do adults, you 
will see that the worst possible fate is to be friendless” (p. 26).
Students and Teachers in a Personalist Environment
The appreciation o f Macmurray's ideas by staffers at Wennington School would be put 
to the test. Student populations were mixed and not all students who arrived at the school were 
inclined to engage in its curriculum with great enthusiasm. The model selected by Bames in 
consultation with his staff, emphasized practical applications in real-life situations. For example, 
children were expected to assist in the development and maintenance o f the property. Practical 
building skills reinforced ideas from science and mathematics. The arts were also strongly 
emphasized. Creating ceramics and paintings, and writing and performing plays were every bit 
as important at learning mathematical algorithms.
Adaptability was essential if these personalist norms o f behaviours and objectives 
informed by personalism were to be manifested in daily life at the Quaker school. Children 
showed more evidence o f  flexibility than did the adults. Staff had great difficulty in overcoming 
set pattems o f  behaviour shaped by previous indoctrination in state or private schools.
Bames reports that perhaps the main concern o f children was the series o f chores for which they 
were responsible. One o f  the aims o f  the Wennington community was to be self-sufficient in
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food. That worthy aim was even more significant as the whole o f England dealt with severe 
wartime and post-war shortages.
It might have been expected that children, whatever their background, would respond 
to humane treatment. I am sure that is true —  in the long run, sometimes the very long 
run.... There were many examples among the children o f an initial failure to understand 
what we offered in a way of life. They could accept as a biological statement that land 
had to be dug, for potatoes to grow; but the force behind the spade has to come from the 
heart, not the head, and the heart had yet to feel the connection between digging in the 
autumn and dinner next year (p.32-33).
The adult population in the school faced problems "different and more serious" (p.33). 
Nearly all were conscientious objectors in the midst o f a rural England deeply engaged in the war 
effort. Nonetheless, relations with the neighboring community were excellent. Quakers had been 
part o f the regional scene for centuries, and local residents came to recognize Wermington School 
as a hard-working community led by responsible adults.
To Bames. it was the ingrained idealism o f staff which could be troublesome. He wTites: 
Adults are less adaptable [than children], and the more idealistic they are the more severe 
the problem. Idealists can work together happily on committees to decide what the world 
ought to be like or what statesmen ought to do; but put them all in one house to live 
together and share the routine duties and you will meet plenty of trouble, (p. 33)
To distinguish the minority o f reliable idealists —  whom he reports amounted to about 25 
percent o f the staff —  from the more quarrelsome majority, Bames theorizes that idealists come 
in two basic types. The first type wishes to live his beliefs by realizing a pattem which appeals to 
the intellect, conscience, or moralistic judgment. “It can be self-centered in that it makes the 
idealist feel good, feel right, feel that he is really meeting the problems of society” (p.25). The 
second and rarer type grounds her interpretation o f the world and human reality in an “ idealistic” 
philosophy, and incorporates a large measure o f “commitment.” “Commitment,” explains 
Bames, “in the sense used to make the distinction, is a willingness to respond to «eetf...however 
uistuibiiig it may be to any preconceived ideas wc may have. It is readiness to respond to other 
people, to engage with them in an exploration that may be self-revealing and disturbing.
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prompting frequent reassessment, not only on what is outside ourselves but also o f the kind of 
beings we imagine ourselves to be” (p. 33-34) [italics in original].
Bames hits upon a theme in M acmurray's personalist approach which has only been 
alluded to so far. Although Bames is taken up with the headmaster's duties o f  managing a school 
and therefore emphasizes practical politics, there is an underlying philosophical seriousness.
The engagement o f one person with another demands a full opening o f self to be 
authentic, to be genuine; but the exchange cannot stop there. If only the self is displayed, then it 
remains a static entity, invariable in its integrity, solid in its cohesiveness; “perceptible” but 
“unmoved” in Macmurrayan language. In his reminiscences o f teaching at Wennington, Bames 
hints that the most philosophically appropriate grounding for studeni-teacher relations includes 
an approach which sees the self opened to display and, through the process o f being informed by 
the Other, being changed in ways leading to growth in both self and Other. The relationship 
between student and teacher must lead to such growth.
There is a resulting “pragmatism” which for Bames is a practical demonstration of 
M acmurray's own beliefs that any philosophical theorv’ must be relevant to real life to bother 
with. It is also anchored, says Bames. in "the fundamental urge that moves us.” love 
[Macmurray uses the term “friendship”].
Love must indeed be the fundamental urge that moves us, the guiding light, but you 
caimot squeeze love into a moral pattem. It has to work within the complications of real 
life. Educational ideas and projects are often in the same category as ideals; they can be 
strongly held as what ought to be done (p. 34) [italics in original].
He makes a similar point when describing the instituting o f student government at 
Wermington. The committed democrats on staff insisted the process begin early, while Bames 
urged delay. The process went ahead, and failed. Again, says Bames, the lesson is that 
cooperation works best when based on real needs with goals which can be articulated and shared. 
As Macmurray’s personalist stance suggests, philosophy must be practical and the practical is 
found in real-life situations, not artificially contrived environments, or problems, or management
tp p h n in i ip ç  n r  n r in n in ln c
Men and women, and boys and girls, develop creative and well-founded forms o f co-
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operation better when they are responding to necessity than when they try to realize an 
ideal that they think is to be desirable....Our imagination is stirred by a need and leaps 
ahead, sometimes very far ahead, o f our experience; it needs a discipline, and the sharper 
the necessity the more effective the discipline (p. 35).
Persons, Macmurray would agree, are problem-solving creatures who do best at bettering 
themselves and improving their environment when fully engaged with others.
What makes Wennington special as a school is that from the start children could not help 
but be aware o f the challenges faced by adults as they attempted to create the school, almost 
literally from the ground up. They were given the opportunity to recognize the challenges being 
made available. Children and adults were deeply involved in creating — physically and 
emotionally —  their own culture o f learning.
The Curriculum
The structure o f the daily curriculum did not differ in significant respects from that of 
many other residential comprehensive schools in Britain at the time. Classes were structured so 
as to allow the maximum amount o f participation possible to students. The visual and dramatic 
arts received strong support. All students spent much time developing skills suited to personality 
types, interests, talents, and dispositions.
What was different, essentially so, was the degree to which all members o f this learning 
community were involved in the physical development and maintenance o f the school. The 
typical day began at 7 a.m. with kitchen assignments and a breakfast taken at one's own pace. 
Before the 8:45 a.m. assembly there was time for swimming, music rehearsals, cleaning o f 
corridors and the pottery shed, and an assortment o f jobs. Teaching periods numbered five in the 
morning and two or three in the afternoon. Tea was at seven with most evenings left free for 
students.
Class structure was rather conventional, but one innovation is worth noting. Each student 
was required to produce a research assignment every two weeks. Barnes explains this "made it 
possible to fit drama rehearsals, debates, musie praetiee, and any other sporadic activity into an 
evening, without disturbance to class work. Sixth-formers were encouraged in this assignment
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system, to behave as students rather than as school-children doing limited bits for particular 
occasions” (86). Bames had to respond to the criticisms o f those who expected Wennington to 
be a kind o f Quaker Summerhill. Why had he not pursued a more creative or daring curriculum? 
His response is that experimentation at Wennington was based on "the fearlessly open kind o f 
personal relationship” the teacher was encouraged to develop with students. Anything new 
would have to grow out o f the life of the School, not from the imposition or adoption o f ideas 
from elsewhere, however enlightened (p.86).
If Wennington was to be a school whose philosophical orientation was shaped by John 
Macmurray's personalism, then the emphasis had to be on the nature o f relations between 
persons. How these are to be viewed and developed is what mattered most. Just how Chemistry. 
Mathematics. English and the other subjects o f the curriculum were taught comprised a second- 
order priority, not a first-order one.
Reflecting on his attempts to use personalism as a basis for schooling. Bames says he 
learned something about the nature o f leadership in an educational institution which needs to 
retain its status as a state-sanctioned school and yet still offer an alternative to existing models o f 
learning; to provide a culture o f learning in which risk-taking is not merely academic but 
involves a much wider, fuller, and richer curriculum. He also warns that "it may be the pioneer 
was asking too much o f the people." by not gauging well enough what kind o f change, and how- 
much of it was appropriate and when.
Bames is skeptical o f an approach which mandates progressivism. The idea of 
compulsion is repellent because o f its authoritarianism. 'T h e  teacher who rebels against 
traditional ideas in education and substitutes what he imagines to be freedom, may be as remote 
from the reality o f children's lives as those he rebels against. He may simply be taking children 
from one prison and putting them in another” (1980 p. 107).
John Macmurray had been recruited as the first Head o f the Board o f Govemors o f 
Wennington, a post he would retain for virtually the entire existence o f the school. The 
management style for which Bames opted was meant to overcome what he terms the "traditional 
gap” between school and governing body. Members o f the board were urged to be frequent 
visitors to the school. Macmurray himself, although now Professor o f Philosophy and Dean o f
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Arts at the University o f Edinburgh, found time "to help build the shelves for our Library.” He 
attended meetings at end-of-term and frequently addressed the school on Sunday evenings (p.83).
Macmurray’s determination to remain connected to Wennington in as practical a manner 
as possible is characteristic o f his approach to participation in community life. Personalism is a 
philosophical perspective, not a standpoint. It does not urge quiet, reflective contemplation from 
a position o f rest. The personalist is involved, engage as French personalists would say. in the 
very conditions in which the personalist finds herself or himself. Bames makes a similar point 
when writing about change within schools; familiarity with a variety o f institutions in which he 
worked as a teacher before founding Wennington taught him of this possibility. Bureaucratic 
structures are amenable to progressive development. .And change as improvement is undertaken 
first by the recognition o f the existence or prevalence o f fear, and then its removal.
Macmurray maintains that fear, not hatred, is the great obstacle to authentic relations 
between persons. Fear compels a shrinking away from the Other, a narrowing o f  mind, a 
constricting o f the heart, a shriveling of the emotions, and a crippling o f the emotional reasoning 
we need to pursue our happiness, which is always found in others. Barnes applies the lesson to 
the administration o f education. It is one he reports having leamed while a teacher o f science at 
Bedales School, a progressive-minded institution at which he taught for 10 years.
The removal o f fear implies the removal of anxiety, guilt, hostility, individualism, all the 
conditions that box up children — or adults —  within themselves. That this was 
happening in the boys and girls could be seen in their faces, the way they looked at you, 
the interest and acceptance they showed. It established relationships o f mutual trust. The 
removal o f  fear also set the mind free to explore, gave a child confidence in the ideas that 
came to him ( p . l9 ) .
He comments that "what one does creatively in education is a product, not so much of 
intellectual sorting out, as of what becomes built into one’s personality as a result o f what one 
goes through —  in every dimension” (p .17). Naturally, openness o f this kind comes at the cost 
o f allowing oneself to be vulnerable and, in the context o f schooling, for a teacher to abandon 
the defense mechanisms which normally first establish, then maintain, the distance deemed 
necessary between teacher and student.
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In a personalist pedagogy, once commitment to the Other is made, once the opening of 
one’s self to other selves is undertaken in the understanding that reciprocity is possible, then 
acknowledging that is necessary to our achieving the status o f complete persons. "If we thought 
o f education in community as a nourishment o f the whole personality then we had to be prepared 
to accept, and meet constructively, all that is in humanity —  so very much more than we are 
normally willing to meet in the classroom” (p.39). Any learning environment fashioned along 
lines taught be Macmurray had to recognize that society is built through friendship, not mere 
cooperation. As Bames put it, "Because the School was a community rather than an institution, 
the inner life o f the adults mattered as much as that o f the boys and girls, perhaps even more, for 
a group of teachers divided among themselves and personally unfulfilled cannot establish the 
conditions for children to grow” (p. 196).
Lessons from Wennington
Wennington School operated as a residential school for elementary and secondary 
students from 1941 to 1976. Perhaps fittingly it closed the same year in which John Macmurray 
died. A declining student enrolment, and the expectation that the school would meet national 
standards o f compensation for its teaching staff were the reasons cited for closing the school. 
Barnes's personal qualities as a leader had always been singularly significant for the life o f 
Wennington. With age came weariness and a decline in the energy available for the task.
In his concluding reflections on the meaning o f Wennington School as an experiment in 
personalist community-building, Bames offers some words o f encouragement to those wishing to 
pursue a similar experiment, however modified, within their own leaming cultures.
He points out that much media criticism o f education is ill-informed because it almost 
always takes a narrow interest in instruction and skills. "W hat of the deeper education we have 
been considering?...W hat do careful observers find behind the facade o f organization and 
marketable results? What o f the needs o f children as persons in relationship growing towards 
maturity, o f  the need for a creative and responsible community sense?” (p.216). The personalist 
perspective can help create a culture o f learning that recognizes the importance o f those affective 
needs.
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Bames contrasts the intimacy afforded all at Wennington and the general anonymity 
reigning in most schools. Other writers with philosophical perspectives compatible with 
personalism, such as economist E .F.Schumacher, reinforce Macmurray's and Bam es's aversion 
to gigantism in general and in schools in particular. Here Schumacher echoes M acmurray's own 
concem over the “organic” being used as a metaphor o f human growth and social engineering. 
This means the same as [Ivan] Illich's statement about the schools being the reproductive 
organs o f the consumer society, for nineteenth century metaphysics had an ideal of 
unlimited progress, which meant unlimited production and an unlimited exploitation of 
natural resources, carefully provided by a Darwinian God (p.213).
If our ailment is metaphysical, Bames says quoting Schumacher, then so must its cure be 
metaphysical. As education has become a tool servicing the interests o f exploitative and rampant 
consumerism —  a new form o f barbarism, as maintained by education critics such as Hemy 
Giroux — it has ceased to permit emancipation.
Education which fails to clarify our central convictions is mere training or indulgence.
For it is our central convictions that are in disorder, and as long as the present anti­
metaphysical temper persists, then disorder will grow worse. Education, far from ranking 
as m an's greatest resource, will then be an agent o f destruction, in accordance with the 
principle corniptio optim ipessima  (p.213).
Divisiveness in all its forms is anathema to Bames. It is the pitting o f  persons against 
each other, a threat to the social fabric, and a condition always exploited by the politically 
ambitious. He asks.
Can the necessary enduring commitment be anything other than an expression o f the 
religious dimension o f  life and relationship? This means, not necessarily ’belief or a 
theological pattem, but the awareness that brings all experiences, hopes, desires and 
actions, into an indestructible, growing and life-long coherence. It perceives that the 
future must be nourished by love and eagemess and it insists on action (p.204-205).
That the life-span o f Wennington School was as long as it was is a tribute to Kenneth 
Barnes's talents as headmaster, and to John Macmurray's animating philosophy of personalism. 
Macmurray’s ideas grounded the school in a perspective which allowed for both social and
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personal development.
The School and Quakerism
From the very first, Wennington School was known as a Quaker institution. Kenneth 
Bames and several members o f the teaching staff were members o f the Religious Society o f 
Friends. Although most o f the student body was drawn from non-Quaker households, the 
spiritual teachings o f Friends —  along with John M acmurray's personalism —  were a vital part 
o f the defining profile o f Wennington.
As Macmurray developed his personalist philosophy he was increasing his involvement 
with the Religious Society o f Friends. He had become familiar with Quaker approaches to social 
issues, particularly pacifism, prior to World War One. That interest had grown over the years to 
include a growing affinity with Quakerly ways on a host o f issues, mainly in the area of social 
justice. Macmurray claims his philosophical stance enjoys a viability and authenticity- 
independent o f any theological position-taking and dogmatic assertions. I agree. But that is not 
to say that it must be divorced entirely from connections, at some level, with a spiritual 
community whose teachings were central to the founding and operating o f  Wennington School, 
and which will figure prominently in our understanding o f what a Macmurrayan personalist 
pedagogy will look like today. To that end take a look at how Quakerism, has strongly- 
expressed tendencies which are recognizably personalist. John Macmurray sought as thinker and 
acting moral agent one goal throughout his professional life as an educator, and as an ipso facto 
moral theologian: to increase the Light.
The Religious Society o f  Friends, better know by the term Quakers, is a spiritual body 
which he long supported as an outsider. After leaving the shelter o f the Church o f Scotland, as 
we saw an effect o f his experiences in the trenches, Macmurray spent many years on what I 
term a pilgrimage. Through his professional research and teaching as a metaphysician and moral 
philosopher he tackled those great social problems which plagued persons living through a 
century challenged by materialism and totalitarian politics o f one stiipe or another. He sought to 
offer practical advice grounded in a disciplined intelligence shaped according to pedagogical
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principles based on his own personalist perspective.
Macmurray’s very practical demonstration o f personalism-in-action in his own life was to 
join the Society o f Friends. The Society, so strongly-even foundationally-pedagogically- 
oriented, offered itself as an almost inevitable choice to the philosopher struggling to reconcile 
his analytical perceptions as an academic, his commitment to social betterment as a political 
actor, and his deep religious faith. After years o f  acting on the margins o f the Society, but long- 
acknowledged as one o f its most valued contributors and publicly-recognized associates, 
Macmurray took the final step o f acknowledging that his own sense o f  duty and obligation 
required that he fully embrace the spiritual community which he had long served with distinction.
The purpose o f the Society o f Friends is to function as a corporate body witnessing to 
God’s presence in the world. This is done through service both spiritual and social. Even in the 
pluralistic cultures in which Quakers find themselves today, there remains an overriding 
commitment to “seeking that o f God in every man."
To understand the Wennington experiment in personalist education well one must 
understand the greater spiritual context in which it was developed. That was the Quaker 
experiment. The Society of Friends was founded not to reform society but to make a new world 
from the ashes o f  the old. Its mission was about more than civilizing, or domesticating life, but 
its consecration to God through an everyday mysticism generally bereft of dogma. In 
Macmurray, this essentially religious understanding of life was converted into a personalist 
viewpoint which, in turn, is the foundation o f the pedagogy used at Wennington.
The purpose o f the Society was not primarily to comprise yet another ecclesiastical body 
struggling to find its place in the competing marketplace o f religions which was the agitated 
church scene o f 17"' century England. Such a movement toward evangelization was certainly 
part o f the equation and Quakerism’s founder, the spiritual Seeker from Yorkshire George Fox, 
spoke frequently o f his vision “o f a great people to be gathered."
The movement was founded by the nonconformist Fox after four years o f  wandering 
throughout northern England in search o f spiritual enlightenment. He recalls in his Journal his 
encounters with leaders o f the established Church o f England and dissenters, none o f whom 
could address his concerns. At age 23, in the fourth year o f his wandering. Fox heard a voice
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saying "there is one, even Christ Jesus, who can speak to thy condition.” He later maintained this 
was a direct call from God to become an itinerant preacher and to promote the concept o f the 
Inward Light, or Inner Voice. He believed that an element o f God’s spirit is implanted within 
every person’s soul, a theological concept he called "the seed o f Christ,” or "the seed o f  Light.” 
This ability to access God directly and enjoy a mystical union with the divine was 
available to all and always had been. The practical implications for Quakerism as a movement 
were tremendous. If each person, regardless o f station, intellectual attribute, or caste enjoyed 
potential union with God without benefit of mediation, then the elaborate ecclesiological 
structure was superfluous. And not merely an urmecessar)' add-on. but in fact an impediment to 
authentic spiritual sonship and daughtership with God. There was no longer a need for what 
Quakers dismissed as "steeple houses” (churches); prayer books, dogmatic theology and 
"compelled” interpretation; all rituals, gowns, creeds, dogmas, and other “empty forms” were 
"customs” to be avoided because they interfered with the worshiper’s communion with others o f 
the pure Light.
Friends were to worship in silence. At Meeting for Worship participants would speak 
only when they felt moved by the Holy Spirit. The worship style of Friends was frenzied in the 
early years o f  the movement's growth, but it settled into a more decorous silence as they found 
their spiritual grounding through daily and weekly practice o f this meditative practice.
Fox's message proved enormously popular. It drew thousands to a rapidly consolidating 
spiritual movement offering freedom of thought, worship and expression. The mutuality inherent 
in the Quaker movement was proving appealing to large numbers o f seekers in a century marked 
by much seeking. Fox abhorred dogma. He was quite clear about the nature o f his own insights 
and “leadings” (obligations to action) to which they compelled him. However, he saw no merit 
in dictating experiences for his followers.
Historian and Quaker mystic Rufus M. Jones, explains in well in a 1937 World 
Conference o f Friends report:
The original message o f George Fox which gathered the Societ>' o f Friends was never 
systematically formulated by him. It was essentially the faith, based on personal 
experience, that God and man have direct relationship and mutual correspondence. This
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was not ...a doctrine, but a live and throbbing experience. George Fox kept his faith as 
concrete as possible and avoided, as far as one can, abstract phrases which tend to 
become mere words. The principle which he named ’that o f God in man' as first of all 
for him a personal discovery that something not himself, something beyond himself, was 
operating in him as an invading spiritual power. He seemed to have found a central 
stream of life, flowing over the ocean o f darkness and death, and revealing to him the 
infinite love o f God present here in the world where we live (BYM. p.206).
The “experimental” faith (we might today use the term experiential or existential) which 
Fox and the early Friends experienced soon led to positions which over the past three centuries 
have developed into mandates to action.
The Quaker emphasis on the personal experience, the convincement that such an 
experience is an irmate part of what it is to be a human person, deeply impressed itself upon 
Macmurray. His philosophical project, which we know as a "dynamic" perspective rather than a 
"static” one. is premised on this core idea. The human person can know God. Every person's 
dignity is comprised of that fact alone. The possibility o f God-relatedness is the characteristic 
which distinguishes human beings from the rest o f Nature. The human person is not only a 
natural creature, but a supernatural one.
Patience, guidance from loving others, and nurturing within a disciplined community will 
help anyone recognize the bond of union, the experience of the one Divine Light. This inward 
experience is then shared in outward action. Both elements are essential. The knowing of God 
leads inevitably into action for God, action for and through love, or again as Macmurray 
preferred to say, in action through “friendship.” The latter term, perhaps less emotive than 
’love', permits Macmurray’s non-Christian or non-believing readers to take his philosophical 
approach seriously on their own terms. The choice o f words is not accidental, surely, and it 
remains appropriate. The avoidance o f overtly theological language, or damagingly sentimental 
terms, is necessary to allow for an intelligent and unbiased debate on the merits o f M acmurray's 
ideas.
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within, and its validation through consensus within the community. The gathering o f the
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community for worship is a model available for understanding the corporate or communal 
implications o f Macmurray’s personalism. Macmurray agrees with all other Quakers that 
meetings for worship are for action, not for contemplation. As stated above, Macmurray does not 
value contemplation as sufficient in itself. It must issue in action, activity, engagement with the 
Other.
A pedagogy grounded in the teachings o f John Macmurray’s framework o f personalist 
philosophy, can help educators to fashion a culture of leaming which can contend with today's 
challenges. It can do so by combining two elements necessarily existent in Macmuray: The 
individual person's presence, and that person's reliance on community to inform a total 
environment o f support. This perspective can be sharpened by adopting the postmodern element 
o f polyvalency, or multiplicity of voices, and investing it with a sense o f social or corporate 
responsibility.
A number o f present-day critics o f education have articulated positions not terribly 
different from that o f  Macmurray. For example, any coherent personalist pedagogy can well 
benefit from the work on "caring" produced by Nell Noddings, and John P. M iller's "Holistic" 
curriculum. The benefit available with Macmurray is that his work provides a comprehensive 
theoretical framework within which these post-modern views may be accommodated. The most 
significant contribution in that regard is that Macmurray’s approach is a required corrective to 
some serious deficiencies in the post-modern models.
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Personalism and the Postmodern Context
Before looking at how a personalist pedagogy can be renewed or reinvigorated with an 
infusion o f contemporary thought, we should examine how profoundly postmodernism has 
influenced educators over the past three decades or so. The challenge o f postmodernism is 
serious. It questions the very meaning o f "meaning,” and the human ability to convey such 
through narrative structures. John Macmurray’s personalism, and any pedagogy deriving from it, 
is anchored in the root metaphor o f our culture —  the Biblical narrative in all its depth and many- 
nuanced subtleties. Macmurray’s defense o f a “meaning-full’’ universe is further advanced by 
consideration o f schemes of personalist psychology based on M acmurray's insights.
The Submergence and Resurfacing o f Personalism
With the closing o f Wennington School ended an important chapter in personalism. 
Wennington had been the first school where the curriculum and human relations were fashioned 
through personalist principles articulated by John Macmurray.
Macmurray was never a teacher at Wennington, but, as Chair o f the Board o f Govemors. 
he retained a lively and enthusiastic interest in the school, its students, and its teachers. In an 
unpublished manuscript, Macmurray wrote that in its “effort to make the school itself a society of 
friends, the development of the personal lives o f their pupils” was the primary focus at 
Wennington (quoted in Creamer, 1996, p. 17). Macmurray’s spiritual presence was manifested 
through the personalist stance adopted by the school's headmaster, and some of its teaching staff. 
The devotion o f  Kenneth Bames to John Macmurray and personalism fostered two books, but in 
neither o f these did Bames formally articulate a personalist pedagogy.
After the Wennington experiment, Macmurrayan personalism, as an undergirding 
philosophy for any pedagogical enterprise, virtually disappeared. A few personalist scholars, 
mostly those connected with the traditions o f personalism at Boston University, did write a little 
on personalism and education (Bertocci, 1979). However, the record is scanty. The very word 
"personalism” is apparently rarely heard in most departments o f  philosophy, and aside from one 
joum al and its accompanying website on the Intemet, references to this orientation are
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difficult to come by in the academic literature. It is hardly existent at all in educational thought.
Since the late 1960's and early 1970's, a new generation o f scholars o f education has 
arisen. The philosophical orientations and perspectives which many o f these writers have 
adopted do not necessarily have much in common with each other, but generally they stand at 
some variance to that o f personalism. These approaches vary from the neo-Marxist critical 
pedagogy of Henry Giroux, to the ethics o f Nel Noddings, through the "education-as-the- 
practice-of-freedom” community represented by writers such as Paolo Freire and bel hooks.
Many o f  these platforms fit under the umbrella o f “postmodernism.”
One of the few features they share is a denial o f the transcendent. However reality may 
be interpreted, they maintain, it cannot be done with reference to "meaning” as lying outside o f 
human agency. Baldly, and perhaps crudely stated, they adopt Nietzche's stance that God is dead 
and we must learn to live without Him anymore. All cultures and their artifacts, including the 
metanarratives, are human-made and radically subjective.
The Voice o f Suspicion: Postmodernism
The postmodernist environment is the one in which a great deal o f current theorizing 
about education is taking place. It is an attitude prominent in faculties o f education around the 
world, and so, singularly influential upon persons training to become teachers. Defining the term 
is a difficult, but necessary, exercise.
A good starting point is available with Jean-Francois Lyotard, who writes: "1 define 
postmodernism as incredulity toward metanarratives” (The Postmodern Condition, 1984, xxiv).
In his work Lyotard argues that no one set o f  rules, no one story, no one condition, accurately 
explains knowledge and communication. No one interpretation o f life and the historical process, 
un real in any case, can be “priveleged” over and against another. Postmodern theorists warn us 
that we should all be aware o f instances o f  privileging one set o f ideas over another.
Lyotard reports that postmodernism is continually being refined: “The emphasis 
can be placed on the powerlessness o f the faculty o f presentation, on the nostalgia for presence 
felt by the human subject, on the obscure and futile will which inhabits him in spite o f 
everything.” What one moment challenges our ideas, our senses o f how things are, becomes, at
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the next moment, that which we seek to challenge {The Postmodern Condition, p.79).
This concept o f “privileging” information is at the core o f the postmodernist stance.
Many discourses among postmodernist thinkers deal with ideas o f what is “privileged” and what 
is “silenced” or suppressed. The concem here is postmodernism’s view o f metanarratives, the 
interpretive stories present in cultures and civilizations which assist their members to make sense 
o f the world and their place in it. For example, the Bible is likely the greatest metanarrative of 
Western Civilization. When understood in the sense in which Canadian scholar Northrop Frye 
does, the Bible is the “great code” our civilization has used to create the mythologies o f art and 
story essential to interpretation and for self-understanding. To postmodernists, the Bible is an 
example o f a metanarrative in need o f deconstruction. Any o f the conventional Biblical 
interpretations, o f whatever stripe, miss the mark by failing to appreciate the essentially 
contingent nature o f the Bible. And. since there is no transcendent reality beyond the physical 
(and what human beings construct with the physical), then the whole notion o f theism, o f 
meaning being inherent in life, is absurd.
Further, the privileging of metanarratives have political and historical consequences.
Many postmodernists argue that the Biblical metanarrative was central to Europe's sense of 
itself as a cultured civilization advancing the work o f God. When its civilization-building 
enterprise encountered peoples with radically different perspectives in the 15'" and 16'" centuries, 
e.g. the First Nations o f the “New World,” the Bible was, o f course, "priveleged” while the 
Amerindian cultures and their metanarratives were "silenced.”
Postmodernism, explains American scholar Gertrude Himmelfarb, started as a school o f 
literary theory, but it has become prominent in other disciplines such as philosophy, 
anthropology, law, theology, history, and education. Deriving from Friederich Nietzsche. Martin 
Heidegger, and others, its more immediate progenitors, and most frequently cited authorities, are 
Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Derrida is generally associated with such 
“deconstructionist” ideas as the “aporia” of discourse, the indeterminacy and contrariness of 
language, the “fictive” and “duplicitous” nature o f signs and symbols, the dissociation o f words 
from any presumed reality. Foucault is .more directly respon<?ible for the emphasis on the "power 
structure" immanent in language, not only in the particular signs and ideas that “privilege" the
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coherent thought —  “logocentric,” “totalizing,” “authoritarian” discourse, as it is characterized 
(Himmelfarb, p. 1-11).
In her useful textbook, Nel Noddings explains postmodernism more simply as “more o f a 
mood than a movement” {Philosophy o f  Education, p.72). Yet, considering the number o f  
scholarly books, professional journals, and international conferences and assemblies associated 
with self-described postmodernists, it is difficult not to qualify Noddings's statement as 
disingenuous. The postmodernist approach is a quite substantial “movement.”
Noddings points out that “capital-T truth” is non-existent for postmodems, a chimera, an 
illusion which was founded on an epistemology (theory o f knowledge) now understood to have 
been based on metanarratives and symbol systems which collapse under the scrutiny o f 
dispassionate deconstruction. Such views stress the priority o f the social to the individual; reject 
the universalizing tendencies o f philosophy; prize irony over knowledge; and give the irrational 
equal footing with the rational in our decision procedures. Postmodernism is a cultural 
sensibility. There is no purpose, perspective, or real objectivity. Without these, how can there be 
knowledge in the traditional sense? How can fields o f inquiry which maintain that knowledge 
can be produced and tested against an authentic existing reality through impartial inquiry be 
acknowledged as authentic? In answer to the first question. There cannot, and in answer to the 
second question, there is no validating authenticity.
Therefore, the hallmark o f postmodernism is the precommitment to relativism in relation 
to questions o f truth. To use the language which has become characacteristic o f the movement, 
one may say that postmodernism represents a situation in which the signifier (or signifying) has 
replaced the signified as the focus o f orientation and value. The implications for a Macmurrayan 
personalism will be made apparent later.
In terms o f the structural linguistics developed initially by Ferdinand de Saussure, the 
recognition o f the arbitrariness o f the linguistic sign and its interdependence with other signs 
marks the end of the possibility o f fixed, absolute meanings. Thus, writers such as Derrida. 
Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard argue that language is whimsical and capricious, and does not 
reflect any overarching, absolute linguistic laws. It is arbitrary, incapable o f  disclosing meaning.
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Some postmodernists maintain that contemporary society is trapped in an endless network o f 
artificial sign systems, which mean nothing of themselves. They merely perpetuate the belief 
system(s) o f those who created them.
One aspect o f postmodernism which illustrates this trend particularly well, while also 
indicating its obsession with texts and language, is deconstructionism. Deconstructionism is a 
critical method which virtually declares that the identity and intentions o f the author o f a text are 
irrelevant to the interpretation o f  the text, prior to insisting that, in any case, no meaning can be 
found in it. All interpretations are equally valid, or equally meaningless. Himmelfarb points to 
Paul De Man as a postmodernist who “has gone so far as to suggest that the very idea of 
'm eaning’ is fascistic and is to be resisted as contraiy to the free expression o f the human 
intellect” (Himmelfarb, p. 29). We begin to appreciate postmodernism’s comprehensive 
skepticism, and its deep commitment to a secularist view o f  human reality. It is a skepticism 
which traces its lineage back to Rene Descartes’s fashioning o f his own questioning approach to 
human truth and certainty.
Opponents o f postmodernism are said to support the Enlightenment project — “that is. 
the project to improve the condition of humanity through the proper understanding and 
application o f reason” (Noddings, p.73). Macmurray never doubted the validity o f epistemology 
as a legitimate area o f philosophical reflection.
We know from Chapter 1 that Macmurray’s disagreement with the western tradition o f 
philosophy was in how, precisely, with the working o f reason was understood by Descartes and 
his successors. We are “knowing and oughing persons” because o f our feelings, Macmurray 
insists. The correct approach to philosophy will recognize and reconcile the natural harmony 
which exists between the “intellective rationality” of reason, and the “emotive rationality" o f 
feelings. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Macmurray ever thought that the work 
o f  philosophy, from the pre-Socratics to the Existentialists, was a suspect enterprise the way so 
many postmodernists appear to suggest. Again, and this must be understood clearly. Macmurray 
believed in rational thought; he simply suggested that rational thinking had taken a wrong turn 
with Cartesianism, the ancestral echo of both .modernism and its offspring, postmodernism.
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Postmodernism in Education
When the postmodernist perspective is applied to the field o f education, it results in 
findings which reflect the larger themes o f the movement: radical diversity, the distorting and 
compromising effects o f "asymmetrical” power, and the discontinuities to human discourse 
because o f the specificity of languages.
Burbules (1995) looks at these themes where he suggests the following: Firstly, 
multiculturalism, embedded in a world o f instant communication, taxes “the human ability or 
willingness to understand one another or to pursue potential agreement with one another” p.(3). 
Secondly, public and private opinion are too easily shaped and manipulated by power dynamics 
too few o f us recognize or acknowledge. This asymmetrical power compromises even our good 
acts and intentions. Thirdly, our languages are "diverse, and non-congruenl,” and place limits on 
what and how human persons can hope to genuinely communicate “all matters o f  truth, value, 
and so forth” (p. 4). His conclusion repeats the postmodernist theme of a new kind o f doubting: 
Postmodernism can be viewed as. at heart, a kind o f  doubt...It is fair to ask what kind o f 
doubt it is. It is not a Cartesian doubt: a doubt which says that whatever is not clear and 
certain must be rejected....Cartesian doubt was always doubt in the service o f seeking 
certainty. ...We return to the very different connotations o f the term “ incredulity” 
(Lyotard), an inability to believe —  an inability to believe in modernism anymore, or to 
believe in it in quite the same confident way. But what we are incredulous toward are our 
own presuppositions and procedures (Burbules, p. 10).
But the doubting seems to have reached its limit, even with some postmodern critics. 
Feminist writers have availed themselves o f  the new critical perspectives offered by 
postmodernism, deconstructionism, and structuralism, only to find that the values they wish to 
introduce can be assailed by the doubting perspective they have embraced. Highly specialized 
discourse couched in complicated, hard-to-understand vocabulary accessible only to initiates, 
seem to compromise the postmodernist claim o f  seeking a more authentic form o f  human 
freedom. Nel Noddings is a philosopher o f  education who has carved out, in feminist reflection, 
a position which combines many valuable insights o f postmodern thinking with a process o f 
human caring remarkably similar to that described by John Macmurray.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
Before leaving this consideration o f the postmodern perspective, it would be valuable to 
know how Macmurray himself, who died in 1976, might have responded to its challenges. 
Although it is pure speculation, the exercise provides some satisfaction, and can help us 
understand how the connection between Macmurray and Noddings can be made.
Critics of postmodernism attack the position on various grounds. Most of these are o f 
technical interest only and have no place here. However, one critique is worth presenting 
because it suggests how Macmurray himself might have addressed postmodernism, had he lived 
long enough to engage it.
Martin Gardner, an American writer on science and mathematics, has an interesting 
postscript, in one o f his books, in which he addresses postmodernism. Gardner is only a little 
younger than Macmurray and, like him, trained in philosophy and mathematics. Their writings 
indicate they share a similarly unconventional theistic perspective, although there is no reason to 
believe either man ever heard of the other. Gardner writes of postmodernism as a kind o f 
solipsism (the belief that only oneself and one's experiences exist). He is worth quoting at length 
too. because o f his idea o f "correspondencies” ;
[A] few scientists and followers of... postmodernism defend a curious kind o f social 
solipsism. These thinkers do not doubt that there is a world "out there.” independent of 
human minds, but they insist that science, even mathematics, is not a progressive 
discovery o f objective truth but merely a cultural construct, a useful fiction fabricated by 
human minds. The belief o f scientists and ordinary people that science is a cumulative 
process for discovering how the universe is constructed and how it behaves is dismissed 
as myth....Of course no realist denies that culture has a strong influence on how science 
operates, and even on what mathematicians do, but this is to say something trivial. The 
significant point is that in spite o f cultural trends, regardless o f science's corrigibility, the 
plain fact is that science gets ever closer to an understanding o f nature.... The accuracies 
o f  science rest on correspondencies between statements about nature and the actual 
structure o f a universe not made by us. Such statements are, obviously, part o f culture 
because everything humans say and do is part o f culture; but if  the assertions o f science 
did not correspond with great accuracy to the laws o f nature, such accuracies would have
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to be viewed as a monumental set o f miraculous coincidences (Gardner, p.363-364).
I make no claim for the “scientific” validity o f  Macmurray’s personalism, but I do 
maintain that his philosophical perspective provides just the sort o f “correspondency” that makes 
it possible to construct a pedagogy not subject to the suspicion, or corrosive skepticism, of 
postmodernism. The correspondency is found in the work o f a postmodernist “fellow traveler,” a 
scholar who has been critical o f the educational development o f recent decades, who uses much 
of the analytical instruments shaped by postmodernists, but who remains an independent thinker: 
Nel Noddings.
Noddings and Macmurrav: Mothering and the Ethics o f Care
To Noddings, schools should be more like families where caring is the theme that runs 
throughout. Academic disciplines, society, developmental psychology, all these may have their 
place in fashioning the curriculum, but the dominance one or another theme has enjoyed in the 
past has not measurably improved leaming cultures because, at heart, these approaches are about 
control and manipulation. Her critique, here, recalls the postmodernist one o f  "asymmetrical" 
power. She writes in The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education: 
My argument against liberal education is not a complaint against literature, history, 
physical science, mathematics, or any other subject. It is an argument, first against 
an ideology o f control that forces all students to study a particular, a narrowly 
prescribed curriculum devoid o f content they might really care about. Second, it is an 
argument in favor o f greater respect for a wonderful range o f human capacities now 
largely ignored in schools. Third, it is an argument against the persistent undervaluing o f 
skills, attitudes, and capacities traditionally associated with women (1992. xii).
The richer approach is to see the leaming community, such as the classroom, as a family. 
Admittedly it is a large family, but as a mother o f 10 children, Noddings is in an excellent 
position to write knowledgeably about large families.
Wo will pretend that we have a large heterogeneous family to raise and educate... How 
shall vvc educate them?...! will suggest education might best be organized around centers 
o f care: care for self, for intimate others, for associates, for acquaintances, for distant
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others, for non-human animals, for plants and the physical environment, for the human- 
made world o f objects and instruments, and for ideas (1992. xiii).
As Pinar (1995) observes o f the Noddings perspective, "Importantly, the curriculum 
designer is not a bureaucrat, or even a theoretician; she is a mother,” (p. 694). This is the first 
and foundational point o f contact between John Macmurray’s personalism and Nel Noddings's 
feminist ethic of care. At this juncture the two philosophers connect with their respective 
examinations of one seminal idea; mothering as essential to being a person.
Macmurray describes the mother-child relationship as the bond which “creates the 
framework in which all later motives will be shaped." Noddings. too, recognizes those very 
implications o f the infant-child relationship. She applies the lesson to education specifically.
She says so in terms which are virtually Macmurrayan:
Much of the time I will speak as the actual mother of a heterogeneous family, and 1 will 
draw freely on personal experience to illustrate my points. Indeed, one o f my points will 
be that we cannot separate education from personal experience. Who we are. to whom 
we are related, how we are situated, all matter in what we learn, what we value, and how 
we approach intellectual and moral life (1992. xiii).
Noddings recognizes, like Macmurray, that an ethical caring depends upon the "natural 
caring” that come from one's maternal rearing. She writes, “We love, not because we are 
required to love but because our natural relatedness gives birth to love. It is this love, this natural 
caring, that makes the ethical possible,'’ (1984, p. 43). Again with Macmurray, she speaks in the 
language of the personalist:
A new child is not just “flesh o f my flesh” but a genuine other whose appearance may or 
may not mirror mine....l look at her face not as a reflection but as a genuine, unique 
subject who gazes back at me. The very heart of this ethic is the receptivity that allows 
the other to enter my consciousness in all his or her own fulness —  not as a set o f  facts I 
have gathered. The result o f  our encounters will not necessarily be love...Rather, we are 
prepared for the whole range o f human emotions when we meet the other, but 
recognizing our mutual otherness, we reject violence (1995, p. 194).
It is on this most basic and elemental o f  relationships that all forms o f  human relating are
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based, including the form of teaching. Care, and its corollary o f compassion, do not contradict 
thought and reflection, they are its basis. Feelings may motivate but they require, even lead to, 
intellectual activity:
An ethic o f care does not eschew logic and reasoning. When we care, we must 
employ reasoning to decide what to do and how best to do it. We strive for 
competence because we want to do our best for those we care for. But reason is not 
what motivates us. It is feeling with and for the other that motivates us in natural 
caring (Philosophy of Education, p. 138).
Connecting thinking about being human with the earliest experiences o f the human 
person are important to Macmurray. He wants to counter the imagery associated with the 
“organic” metaphor o f  development often attached to the primal mother-child relationship. He 
opposes “the widespread belief...that the human infant is an animal organism which becomes 
rational, and acquires a human personality, in the process o f growing up" (Persons, p. 44).
Human infants, being totally helpless, are "made to be cared for.” Macmurray does not 
doubt that animals are endowed with instinctual drives which allow them to attain a self- 
sustaining status relatively early in their life development. But the maturation process amongst 
human beings is quite long and involves complex emotional support, as well as physical 
maintenance. Human development “ is not simply biological but personal, a need to be in touch 
with the mother, and in conscious perceptual relation with her” (1961. p. 49).
Macmurray goes so far as to say that mothering need not be restricted to females, which is 
generally the case among animals. Male humans can occupy mothering and nurturing roles as 
effectively as female humans. “A human infant does not necessarily die, like an animal, if his 
mother dies in childbirth....A man can do all the mothering that is necessary..."(1961. p. 50).
Looking further at Macmurray’s infant psychology, we find communication as the key to 
understanding the nature o f the person. It is not that he acknowledged communicative abilities 
amongst human persons alone. He recognized that various forms o f communication are 
observable in nature. But these, he argues, “are not definitive.”
In the human infant —  and this is the heart o f the matter —  the impulse to 
communication is his sole adaptation to the world into which he is bom. Implicit and
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unconscious it may be, yet it is sufficient to constitute the mother-child relation as the 
basic form of human existence, as a personal mutuality, as a 'You and F with a common 
life (1961, p. 60).
For Macmurray, this is the beginning o f what is elementary, basic, and essential in all 
human persons: shared experience. Human behaviour inherently contains within it "a reference to 
the personal Other." That reference is carried out and through communication within the matrix 
o f human sociability.
All this may be summed up by saying that the unit o f personal existence is not the 
individual, but two persons in personal relation; and that we are persons not by individual 
right, but by virtue o f our relation to one another. The personal is constituted by personal 
relatedness. The unit o f the personal is not the 'F , but the "You and F (1961, p. 61). 
Personal life is the life o f objectivity. Macmurray says. It is the life o f relation to the 
world o f other people; o f capacity to behave in terms o f that which is other than our self.
Because personal life is not based in our biological nature, it cuts across all racial and sexual 
barriers. Macmurray's position makes it only logical to recognize that restrictions and barriers to 
human relationships such as class division, sexism, ageism, and other forms o f discrimination, 
are obstacles to the personal life, and therefore irrational, since they conflict with our most basic 
natural impulse: sociability.
Further, human sociability is quite unique.“That man is social by nature is true, but highly 
ambiguous. Many animals are social; yet no species is social in the sense in which we are, for 
none has the form of its life determined by communication. Communication is not the offspring 
o f speech, but its parent,” Macmurray writes in Persons in Relation (p. 67).
The Place o f Martin Buber
There is a further connection between Noddings and Macmurray which needs to be 
pointed out. It is quite significant because it suggests, quite strongly in fact, that if Noddings had 
been aware o f John Macmurray’s work, she would quite possibly have founded much o f  her own 
theorizing upon his philosophical insights.
The bridge between these two writers, so widely divided in time, is the figure o f  the
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Jewish Existentialist writer Martin Buber.
A story is related by John E. Costello, S.J. in his introduction to M acmurray's Reason and 
Emotion. Costello writes: “In his one and only meeting with Martin Buber, after three hours of 
conversation Buber is reported to have said, T see no point on which we differ. It is simply that 
you are the metaphysician and I am the poet,”’ (Costello, xix). For his part, in private 
correspondence, Macmurray would later write of Buber, “I met him once and was wholly at one 
with him’’ (quoted in Creamer, 1996. p. 17).
Our interest in this exchange is simply that Noddings considers Martin Buber one o f her 
chief sources o f inspiration in matters philosophical. In all her major works (1984, 1992. 1995) 
Noddings returns to Buber to illustrate her themes. She depends upon him particularly when 
considering her ideas o f “encounter." “inclusion," “1-Thou." "receptivity." and "relation" as the 
basis of teaching. Although Noddings does not subscribe to the Existentialist school —  neither 
did Macmurray. by the way —  she does find some writers from this strand o f  continental 
philosoph) especially useful. Buber's poetry, the factor which seems to appeal profoundly to 
Noddings. is well illustrated by the following quotation which she includes in her textbook on 
educational philosophy:
Trust, trust in the world, because this human being exists —  that is the most inward 
achievement o f  the relation in education. Because this human being exists, 
meaninglessness, however hard pressed you are by it, cannot be the real truth.
Because this human being exists, in the darkness the light lies hidden, in fear 
salvation, and in the callousness o f  one’s fellow-men the great Love (Betyveen .Man 
and Man, quoted in Noddings, 1995, p. 172).
The spiritual kinship between the two men can be made more explicit by comparing the 
above with this observation from one of Macmurray's radio talks later published in a collection 
of writings for sixth formers in British Quaker schools.
Whenever we are driven into the depths o f our own being, or seek them of our own 
will, we are faced by a tremendous contrast. On the one side we recognise the pathetic 
iittieness o f  our ephemeral e.viblciicc. with no point or meaning in itself. On other side, in 
the depth, there is something eternal and infinite in which our existence, and indeed all
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existence, is grounded. This experience o f the depths of existence fills us with a sense 
both o f reverence and o f responsibility, which gives even to our finite lives a meaning and 
a power which they do not possess in themselves. This. I am assured, is our human 
experience o f God. (Quoted in Quaker Faith and Practice. s26.11 )
The spiritual and philosophical kinship between these two men is such that it is quite 
likely that Noddings would find in Macmurray’s personalist philosophy a theoretical framework 
appropriate for her purposes.
The Need for the Spiritual
Both Noddings and Macmurray value spirituality highly. In her several books and man\ 
interviews (Halford. O ’Toole) Noddings repeatedly maintains that as life "is a moral quest." 
room must be made within it for a spiritual dimension. As we have already seen in Macmurray. 
the spiritual was a key element in understanding the historical process, and central to the exercise 
o f reason.
Noddings views her understanding o f spirituality as shaped by a feminist reading o f the 
human experience; one in which the spiritual traditions are recognized as liberation movements 
attempting to bring forward “much more equality and egalitarianism" (Halford. 1999). After all. 
she insists in the same interview, “ ...feminism is not antagonistic to spirituality."
In that same interview Noddings is asked the following question: There's been an 
explosion o f  general interest books about various aspects o f  spirituality. Why do you think 
there's such interest in spirituality now? Here is her answer;
Because people are longing for the sacred. Even those o f us who have rejected 
institutional religion still have that longing. If spirituality is removed entirely 
from schooling, if it becomes a topic that is more or less forbidden in everyday 
conversation, then that longing becomes repressed until people go out and buy 
books about spirituality (Halford, 1999).
Her view, that education “is a multitask, multigoal enterprise" requiring a spiritual 
dimension, meshes easily with that o f many contemporary educators who ai guc for a more 
spiritual interpretation o f  teaching and leaming. Books (Pinar, 1995, Glazer, 1999). and
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magazine articles (Miller and Hunt, 1999) testify to the need, apparently felt by many teachers 
and thinkers in education, for a connection with transcendental, or spiritual, values. The 
conventional, mainline religious communities and churches in which many o f  these writers were 
reared no longer seem to offer a suitable context within which this approach to spirituality may 
be fashioned. That is one reason why writers o f critical pedagogy like bel hooks use themes 
drawn from Buddhist, as well as feminist, sources for their analysis o f the proper purposes of 
education (hooks).
The Contribution o f a Personalist Psvchologv
Macmurray’s personalist project may be described as a virtue theory that rests on a 
religious reading o f the social narrative. It is meant to be self-comprehending moral philosophy 
in action: The free moral agent acknowledging his environment and, being a fully-engaged moral 
agent, building fellowship. As such, Macmurray recognizes that participation in a personalist 
program must be open to other disciplines, particularly psychology which, o f  course, grew out of 
philosophy in the first place. Macmurray’s realization is based on his idea o f  what constitutes 
legitimate science which must proceed from a purely theoretical perspective.
A philosophy which excludes certain questions on the ground that they belong to the field 
o f psychology is giving itself the form o f science, and so becoming a pseudo-science.... 
What I am doing is to remove the limitation which results from adopting a purely 
theoretical standpoint and to reassert the inclusiveness o f philosophy by thinking from the 
standpoint o f action. If thinking is one o f the things we do, then the question, 'W hat 
motive have we for doing it?' becomes an essential element in any philosophical account 
o f thought (1961, p. 132).
As we have seen, Macmurray possessed a keen interest in psychology, particularly in the 
bonding processes o f mother-and-child. His perspective makes the point by connecting moral 
action with knowledge o f motivation. We can know ourselves very well, particularly since our 
“selves” are co-creations which come about because o f our relationship with others. Macmurray 
mainlains we are responsible for the degree o f clarity there is in our own thoughts. We have the 
means to explore inwards as well as outwards. Our minds need not be terra incognita.
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Macmurray would agree that psychological consciousness and moral consciousness are ver>’ 
closely related.
In S e lf as Agent, Macmurray provides four maxims, or categorical rules for thinking, 
which apply to both his philosophical analyses and his work in psychology. The importance of 
the maxims lies in that they assign a dual role to the person. One is both agent (actor) and 
subject (acted upon). The roles are distinguishable but integrated.
1. The Self is agent and exists only as agent.
2. The Self is subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be subject only because it is
agent.
3. The Self is subject in and for the Self as agent.
4. The Self can be agent only by being also subject (p 100-103).
In Interpreting the Universe, Macmurray writes that personality is understood "in the 
nature o f inter-personal consciousness." or a relationship (p. 134). When we look at his proto- 
psychological understanding o f friendship we arrive at the keystone o f Macmurray's philosophy, 
and it is here too where we must acknowledge that no "private” or "individualistic" perspective 
can take root.
The key to the nature o f personality, and so o f reason, lies, then, in the nature of 
interpersonal consciousness, or. in plain terms, in the nature o f friendship. Friendship 
is the name we give to such relationships between persons as are fully personal, that is 
to say, in which one person is consciously related to another person in terms o f his 
personality (1933, p. 13).
Interestingly, Macmurray points out that two persons may share a conscious relationship 
which has an ulterior motive, perhaps a shared goal or a common purpose. Such a relationship is 
then “o f  the organic type," and therefore functional and not personal. Better still, a deep 
animosity is a personal relationship precisely because there is no common purpose, or joint 
project, or extrinsic cooperation implied. In other words, relationships o f  intense dislike are 
probably genuinely personal while merely cooperative (“function-driven") ones are not. The 
rational, Macmurray says, is achieved and expressed only within the authenticaiiy personai 
relationship.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4
The psychologies which have strongly influenced education over the past flft>’ years have 
sprung from three main sources. The first two are Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, and B. F. 
Skinner’s behaviouristic theories. Macmurray would labeled both these schools "mechanistic” 
because o f the reliance on instinctual drives, in the first instance, and automatic responses, in the 
second. A third source, arguably more influential than either Freudianism or Skinnerism 
amongst educators, is Humanistic Psychology, which originated with Abraham Maslow and was 
most fully articulated in practice by Carl Rogers. The enormous growth o f the "human potential 
movement” has been guided by the principles underlying the ideal o f a "self-actualized person.” 
Humanistic education has been a staple o f teacher-training programs in many faculties o f 
education, and many teachers have incorporated principles o f  humanistic psychology in their 
practice (Coulson, p. 83).
But the depth psychologies o f the various schools o f  psychoanalysis and humanistic 
psychology cannot serve the purposes of a genuine personalism, according to critics like Crosby, 
Coulson, ( a co-researcher with Carl Rogers), and Seifert (1995).
Hans Furth, o f The Catholic University o f America, is another psychologist who has 
articulated a personalist perspective (1982). Furth, who worked at the Center for the Study o f 
Youth Development at the Washington, D.C. university', is the only clinical or academic 
psychologist who has mined Macmurray's work for its potential psychological insights. He 
summarizes his findings in seventeen themes which he calls "theses.”
Furth reports that his work on M acmurray's personalism, as articulated in the Scottish 
philosopher’s mature work {The S e lf as Agent, and Persons in Relation), “is a powerful 
framework for a comprehensive study o f human development, and for a contructivist-relational 
theory o f knowledge.” (365). Furth teased out the themes, provided some personal interpretation, 
and compared these to then-current (1982) psychological notions.
A detailed examination o f Furth’s work is useful for three reasons; It is one o f  the very 
few recent investigations or applications o f Macmurray’s personalism; it gives us a rich insight 
into the psychological possibilities o f that personalism, and, finally, because several o f Furth’s 
theses —  particularly theses 11 tluuugh 17 —  aic key to understanding how a Macmurrayan 
personalist pedagogy will work in a learning culture.
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Furth’s Seventeen Macmurravan Theses
Thesis 1: Action and Knowledge. Action is the starting point o f this philosophy. In the 
T do’ o f the action is the implied 'O ther’ which, "offering resistance and support,” gives 
direction to the action. All action is carried out towards, and for, this ‘O ther.’ "The person as 
agent participates in existence and determines the other positively. The person as subject 
withdraws form existence and, therefore, determines the other only negatively or theoretically 
(emphasis added).
Thesis 2: Reason. The rational nature o f an action is such as long as the agent recognizes 
the ‘Other’ objectively, e.g. as different from one’s se lf  and as existing in its own right. The 
main function of reason, or rationality, is "the capacity to act objectively,” not to "think 
objectively.”
Thesis 3: Intention. Agency, the ability to engage is action, is the critical characteristic o f 
a person. An action is personal when it is intended. Intention is unreflective. it is connected to 
the act as the act is being carried out. The intention-to-act cannot be div orced from the action 
itself, and it has nothing to do with results since these may or may not coincide.
Thesis 4: Three Inclusive Realities. A person's reality includes the body, its biological 
organism, its matter, or material substance. It then follows that personal action is also organic 
behavior and material fact. The exercise o f intention (Thesis 3) must include organic motivation 
as well as material causality, therefore. Furth argues that this inclusion rule "abolishes the 
knowledge-created dualism o f mind and body.” The personal is the ground from which 
everything else rises. It is the ‘‘primary and inclusive reality from which other forms o f reality 
are derived by an abstraction o f exclusion.” Furth further maintains that philosophizing or 
creating psychologies o f  human understanding grounded only in the physical or organic "cannot 
end in the personal without logical contradictions and ... inadequacies, as is amply documented 
by the Western history o f thought.”
Thesis 5: Determination and Freedom. Much o f our biological lives develop according 
to recognizable processes. Ihese processes are observable through the sciences. Objective facts 
and laws can be derived from these observations. The personal is not (fully) determined and it
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can shape the future. Furth says a "determinate act,” such as blinking one’s eyes, is not an 
"action” in the personalist sense. It is a fact or event. He explains this difficult concept:
According to the inclusion rule (thesis 4) personal actions include determinate (organic 
and material) components which are content for scientific inquiry...The biological 
development o f reason...in the form o f autonomous knowledge...provides the 
‘determinate’ instruments o f Undetermined’ openness and freedom. This (more apparent 
than real) paradox between determination and freedom can only be camouflaged or 
denied to the detriment o f an integrated conception o f  psychological reality” (p.367-368). 
Furth therefore maintains that, with Macmurray, a free will can not only exist with a 
degree o f determinism, but is compelled to do so by virtue o f being "embodied.”
Thesis 6: Material Reality. Mechanics rule the world o f matter, a reality conceived as a 
whole, the parts o f which relate to each other through a series o f predictable, knowable laws. 
Furth says the material world conforms to a continuant (law of inertia) "where every change is a 
transformation o f invariant energy and is due to an external or mechanical causality.”
Thesis 7: Organic Reality. Species evolve and individuals (animal and human) grow and 
decay through time. Through the evolutionary process to which individuals and species are 
subject, “preforms” of knowledge appear. The initial feelings o f discomfort eventually give way 
to consciousness after having passed through phases such as specific sensing, discrimination, and 
perceiving. Developmental patterns of childhood have showed this clearly. The preforms act as 
motivators for ongoing behaviors, further maturing.
Thesis 8: Personal Reality. Commencing in infancy within a dependence model, personal 
reality evolves into a matured relationship with surrounding others. We grow into knowing our 
"selves’ as different from, but connected to, other ‘selves.’ Reason is the instrumentality that 
allows each self to explore and get to know (to a greater or lesser degree) all other selves. Our 
choices may be more or less adequate, more or less right. Furth explains it this way:
.According to the three levels o f reality included in the personal, actions are morally 
good or bad to the extent that they contribute to interpersonal fellowship; they are 
functionally correct or incorrect insofar as they are successful in achieving a useful 
means-end relations (instrumental actions); they are esthetically satisfactory or
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unsatisfactor}' insofar as they are pleasing as an end in themselves (p.368-369, emphasis 
added).
Thesis 9: Organic Base o f  the Personal. A person acts in an unreflective manner when 
action, intention, and knowledge-in-action function properly. Furth says separate and reflective 
forms o f knowledge derive from this base. We are acting persons whose carrying-out-of-actions 
necessitates the organic and material (the body). Action, intention, and knowledge operate in the 
ambient o f the personal, while behaviour, motive (based on the emotions), and consciousness 
operate in the ambient o f the organic.
In Thesis 9 Furth summarizes M acmurray's consideration o f the mind-body problem. 
Given the challenging nature o f these ideas, it is worth using Furth's own words.
Organic behavior reflects organic motive patterns (emotions) that function in the habitual 
continuant fashion of subrational reality. Habitual behavior is a subjective reaction o f  the 
organism to prevailing conditions; the (undifferentiated) organism is cognizant (at 
different levels o f  consciousness) to motivating external or internal states. In contrast, 
action intends an objective relation, that is. a response to the apprehended nature o f the 
other (as different from the knowing self) which could be one's own internal state 
apprehended as an object. In other words, while the knowledge dimension at the personal 
level is rational and informs a (more or less) rational action, the preknowledge dimension 
at the organic level, including unreflective consciousness, is purely motive and informs 
organic behavior (p.369).
Thesis 10: Habit Formation. Furth says Macmurray’s psychology allows organic 
behaviour to “shade” into the personal level when recurring components o f personal tions are 
relegated to the organic level o f habitual behaviour. The greater part o f almost any action 
proceeds automatically because of habit formation. W hile operating “on automatic,” as it were, 
saves psychic energy, Furth maintains that it is here, in habit formation, that the "problematic” of 
personal relations is found. He writes:
For the present rational and personal action is grounded on patterns o f  automatic and 
organic iiiuiivcs wiiicli uciive ifom tlie person’s physiological conditions and the personal 
history o f habit formation. As Freud amply documents, many motives contribute to one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
action, and they may be far from being positively integrated amongst themselves. Thus, 
actions may have results contrary to the ‘best intentions’ o f the moment (p.369).
Thesis 11 : Beginnings o f  the Personal. The bond between mother and child creates the 
framework in which all later motives will be shaped. Positive emotions o f love for the other are 
played o ff  against negative emotions o f fear for the self. Macmurray says that the authentically 
‘personal’ is found only in adults. The infant operates mostly at the organic level. “When does a 
child become a person?” one may ask. Macmurray answers that the question is inappropriate.
It assumes that the concept o f the person is an “isolate,” which the person is not. A human being, 
even a child-not-yet-person. cannot be abstracted from what Furth calls “the concrete realities of 
interpersonal relations.” Even “weak and vicarious” infants inhabit the human web. and can have 
no life without it.
With Thesis 11 we see how this psychological reading o f M acmurray's work makes its 
way into pedagogical thinking. These ideas are developed in Chapter Three, especially in 
connection with the concept of "caring" articulated by Nel Noddings.
Thesis 12: The Other. The field of action exists to allow the meeting of other persons, 
rather than the response to events or the manipulation o f things. The other is support and 
resistance. Experience in life is directed to others, not directed to se lf In terms o f  child 
development, furth  recognizes the presence o f the Other as quite similar to Piagetian concept o f 
the “permanent object.”
From this primary fully personal relation derives in the course o f the child 's development 
the relation to the other which is experienced as organic and material reality (e.g. Piaget's 
permanent object). This is a secondai^ personal relation: it is secondary because the object is 
limited to the non-personal, but it is still personal because it is abstracted from primary personal 
relations, and contains the personal component o f the self-as-agent (p. 370).
Thesis 13: Community. The community, whether it be a school, or town, is the context 
within which one personal other deals with all other personal others. It is meant to be supportive 
o f interpersonal relations in the direct and unconditional manner in which caretakers look after 
children, it is here that “reiations o f mutual reciprocity between equals" (friendship) can develop. 
Macmurray clearly says the functioning family is the first circle o f community. As a human
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being grows into personhood other circles are added, school, workplace, nation, humanity.
Thesis 14: Association. Impersonal and indirect relations dealing with matters such as 
politics, economics, and other means-ends dealings are played out in terms o f  association. 
Macmurray uses the term “society” to signify that grouping o f persons who undertake 
cooperative ventures that do not require direct personal relations. When securing the success o f  a 
project is the aim, it does not matter if one’s fellows are “ friends” in the personalistic sense.
Thesis 15: Morality. Fully personal morality is expressed in the commitment to maintain 
personal community. Justice is the “minimum form” which morality takes to regulate 
interpersonal relations. Furth suggests that "interpersonal relations are moral to the extent that 
they are subordinate to the overriding personal morality (of maintaining community).’’
Thesis 16: Reflective Activities. Macmurray maintains that the human context is that o f 
knowing-in-action. The elements o f this term can be unpacked to understand where our 
reflective activities come from. When the “action” dimension is withdrawn, and the "knowing” 
dimension is used exclusively, then the space is created for reflective activities. Religion and 
philosophy —  all myth-making instrumentalities —  allow for rational reflection on the whole of 
personal relations. When the world is considered an end upon which may be exercised 
contemplation, and a measure o f satisfaction to our emotional rationality, then the result is art. 
Those activities that reflect on the world as means-to-an-end constitute mathematics and science.
Thesis 17: Order o f  Rational Activities. Furth agrees with Macmurray that in any 
personalist hierarchy o f values the topmost position is maintained “ in mature relations and 
experientially lived in friendship relations.” This provides the only authentic, “unconditionally 
objective,” knowledge that is not in need o f extrinsic justification. Action is the principle o f 
verification by which all knowledge is to be evaluated, or appreciated.
This in no way denies the legitimacy o f theoretical activities aimed at improvement o f 
knowledge, it points to the limit o f an intellectual knowledge that treats the world as a 
means, or artistic knowledge that treats the world as an end  (p.371 ).
This detailed look at Furth’s examination o f Macmurray’s personalism helps us 
appreciate the richness o f  the philosopher’s contribution. His philosophy is not only relevant to 
human development but is based upon the possibility and necessity o f  such development.
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The Personalist Psychology o f  Paul Vitz
Another psychological program worked out in a personalist approach closely resembling 
that o f Macmurray’s is that o f  Paul Vitz o f  New York University. Vitz first warns us against 
other psychologists whose work, he maintains, involves a Cartesian individualistic reductionism 
centered around the T think.' “In this dominant psychological tradition objects are seen to be the 
products o f individuals’ thinking and reasoning processes,” he writes (Vitz. p.25).
The personalist, Vitz argues, will see this as an ideologically biased perspective. Instead, 
the T think' should really be understood as a 'we / / j M ’ since a person’s thinking is simply not 
merely one person engaging in thought. Thinking, he maintains, is an activity involving more 
than one. Like Macmurray’s argument that a person is truly herself when in relationship with 
the Other so, from the psychological perspective, thought is not purely private, because "it is 
initially a social construct before it is a priva»'' mental event” (Vitz. p.26).
Yet another psychological authority supporting a Macmurray-like personalism is L. S. 
Vygostky who maintains that other people always have a key role in developing and maintaining 
any given social or historical context. In his terms, "an interpersonal process is transformed into 
an intrapersonal process” (Vygostky, p.57). The basis, then, of the "I think” exists in the prior 
foundation o f the social world; the interpsychological precedes and shapes the intrapsychological 
(p.732).
Macmurray does not say so directly, but there is an implied and necessary distinction in 
his thought between the terms “person” and "individual.’’ The distinction is important in order to 
fully appreciate Macmurray’s interpretation o f distinctions between “society” and “community.” 
Vitz articulates the difference plainly when he maintains that "...in important respects a person is 
the opposite o f an individual, for a person comes into existence by connecting with others, not by 
separating from them” (p.27). The "‘individual” is a creation o f the modem state, a political entity 
or unit with immanent qualities. The “person” is imminent too, o f course, but as personalism has 
it, also possesses transcendent value. There is real danger in prizing the “individual” over the 
“person.” A version o f the “Slippery Slope” argument makes the point. Personalists argue that 
the process o f becoming an individual is fraught with danger and usually ends with a assertion of 
“radical autonomy”—  either overtly and self-consciously or not—  which is destructively
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nihilistic in effect.
By making the self the center o f personality, all modem theories o f personality remove 
people from reality, from the external world created by God and filled with real 
others...[Tjhese theories of the individual are intrinsically subjectivistic....the essential 
logic o f becoming an individual —  that is, o f  separating and distancing the self from 
others —  eventually gets carried to its logical extreme. First, you break the "chains” that 
linked you to parents, then to others; then even to society and culture. Finally, you reject 
the self itself; that is. you separate consciousness from the illusion o f the self. You end 
up rejecting the self and all its desires —  and thus the process o f separation culminates in 
an experience or state o f nothingness. Radical autonomy ultimately means separation 
from everything; it means total or ultra-autonomy, where even the self is gone (Vitz. p. 
28-29).
The destiny o f the individual here portrayed is not particularly appealing, or would not 
appear so. were it not for the fact that only a slightly different interpretation o f the process is 
proving popular among some leading pedagogical thinkers. Several currently active intellectuals 
(hooks. Halifax, O ’Reilley) writing about education have endorsed values and approaches taken 
from Asian philosophies, particularly Buddhism. Buddhist ideas about the " s e l f  and the idea or 
concept o f  the "personal" are at sometimes-considerable variance from traditional Western ones. 
The disintegration or disappearance o f the very idea o f a " s e l f  is one o f the cardinal points of 
Buddhist teaching. .According to Buddhism, o f course, there is no ultimate reality, there certainly 
is no God, and the universe is a Cosmos indifferent to our existence. This movement or trend is 
worth noting here, though its long-term effects cannot be discussed in detail. Perhaps this 
development among pedagogical critics is one kind o f reaction to the overwrought rationalism 
and utilitarianism o f our culture?
In Interpreting the Universe. Macmurray writes that personality' is understood "in the 
nature o f  inter-personal consciousness,” or a relationship (134). When we look at his proto- 
psychological understanding o f friendship we arrive at the keystone o f M acmurray's philosophy, 
and it is here too where we must acknowledge that no private” or "inuividualisiie” pciapcciivc 
can take root.
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“The key to the nature o f personality, and so o f reason, lies, then, in the nature o f  inter­
personal consciousness, or, in plain terms, in the nature o f friendship. Friendship is the 
name we give to such relationships between persons as are fully personal, that is to say. in 
which one person is consciously related to another as a person in terms o f his 
personality” (p. 13).
Interestingly, Macmurray points out that two persons may have conscious relationship 
which has an ulterior motive, perhaps a shared goal or a common purpose. Such a relationship is 
then o f “the organic type,” therefore functional and not personal. Better still, a deep animosity is 
a personal relationship since there is no common purpose, joint project or. extrinsic cooperation 
involved. The rational, he argues, is achieved and expressed only within the authentically 
personal relationship.
We see. then, how a trans-personal psychology meshes easily with M acmurray's 
philosophical insights. The Scottish moral philosopher's personalism agrees that the human 
person, created in community and sustained in mutuality is called to love und forgive. Vitz points 
out that these two imperatives stand in contradistinction to the more prevalent programs in social 
psychology where the individual is called to trust and forget.
These two imperatives are essential to recognizing M acmurray's personalism as a lived 
context. To be truly a person means to possess historical consciousness, and to engage in 
relatedness with the Other. The Tove' o f which Vitz speaks is what Macmurray terms 
‘friendship.’ The ‘forgiveness’ which Vitz says we owe to one another is part o f M acmurray's 
deep respect for the historical process as being endowed with meaning. The universe is personal, 
after all, not indifferent to human life and personal being.
Friendship Through Caring: Towards a Renewed Personalist Pedagogy
What would a “personalist” classroom shaped according to the ideas o f John Macmurray 
look like today? To answer that question one must realize that M acmurray's theoretical 
contribution to understanding the nature o f the human person cannot, by itself, draw the picture 
for us wiihoui interpretation. M acmurray's must productive period was the 1930's to the 1960's. 
The landscape o f pedagogy has changed in significant ways since then, and the closing of
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Wennington School. Thus the need to recontextualize M acmurray's personalism. That is done 
by referring, again, to the work of Nel Noddings, and adding to it the insights o f a personalist 
pedagogical interpretation offered by Thomas Ewens. and American philosopher and 
psychoanalyst.
Noddings has long advocated a Deweyan approach to education. She finds in his writings 
much that is relevant today. She adapts John Dewey’s progressive approaches with her own 
interpretation o f relationships which, as we have seen, are strikingly sympathetic to that o f  John 
Macmurray. But the perspective o f Noddings itself needs further grounding in personalist 
philosophy. That is why her insights have been interpreted within the context of a Macmurrayan 
personalism. M acmurray’s thought is more comprehensive and more sensitive to the historical 
process, and the development of human culture. His view. I maintain, is complete and 
comprehensive. Noddings offers contemporaneity as a former teacher and university professor 
and researcher. Her work is rich with insights from the psychoanalitic research of scholars like 
Nancy Chodorow. and Carol Gilligan.
Ewens (1989) has approached the structuring o f curriculum with M acmurray's idea of 
science and art as “reflective activities" as the organizing principle. Linking this interpretation of 
Macmurray with Noddings’s “centers o f care" will prove fruitful.
Centers o f  Care
The hallmark o f  Noddings pedagogy is her concern with creating "centers o f care.’’ She 
identifies these as caring for: the self (physical life, spiritual life, occupational life, and 
recreational life), the inner circle (relations with equals and unequals); strangers and distant 
others (the immediate and more distant communities); the ecosystem (animals, plant, the earth); 
the human-made world (tools, cultural and aesthetic artifacts); and the intellectual world 
(mathematics, sciences, the arts). Within and about these centers the various elements o f  an 
experiential curriculum can be put together.
Equally important to Noddings is the centrality o f moral education. Such education from 
the care perspective has, she writes, four major componenls; muucliug, dialogue, practice, and 
confirmation (1995, p. 190).
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Modeling is the principal way in which teachers teach care, by demonstration. Human 
relations must teach what it means to be a “carer” and a “cared-for.” Dialogue seeks to explore 
the meaning o f caring within community (the classroom), and to teach students a critical 
perspective. Noddings calls this “engrossment” ; a "nonselective form of attention that allows the 
other to establish a frame of reference and invite us to enter it” (p. 191). By practice she means 
both the action o f carrying out acts o f caring, and the process o f reflection which follows it. This 
pattern reinforces internalization o f the process, the "training o f minds.” Communitj' service can 
be one way in which practice is made available. Finally, confirmation is each person’s 
acknowledgment o f that which is good seeking to emerge from every' other person. It is 
recognizing that all seek to do good. Trust and continuity are essential to confirmation. That 
means that teachers should teach the same students several years in a row in order to develop the 
level o f  trust required.
The Noddings perspective on modeling needs to be embedded more securely if a genuine 
personalistic pedagogy is to be sustained along Macmurrayan lines. I believe that "modeling” is 
most appropriately embraced if a stronger metaphor is recruited. That metaphor is the idea of 
vocation.
Teaching as a Covenanted Vocation
The narrative o f man’s relationship with God is central to M acmurray's understanding of 
history-as-meaning, and revelation-as-truth. Allowing his Christian perspective to influence our 
interpretation o f the teacher’s role is therefore legitimate.
To teach is to exercise an agency o f  moral action within the context o f  learning 
institutions. In order to see the teaching act, the pedagogical moment, in its true light we must 
divorce ourselves from the functional vocabulaiy which has come to dominate the practice. 
Government agencies, academics, school boards, and teachers themselves have long been using 
an occupational lexicon to describe what has always been an essentially moral task. Much of this 
lexicon was embraced in an effort by teachers themselves to acquire enlianced status as 
“professionals,” along with the commensurate financial compensation (Hansen, 1994). The effort 
has been ongoing since the end of the 19"’ century and has been closely associated with the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
project o f secularization within the larger culture. A  personalistic view o f the teaching role 
sees it as “vocational” in the classic sense o f “a call to be answered.” There are elements o f 
compulsion, submission, and service to this. It is not merely a matter o f choosing to engage in 
one profession rather than another. However, as Hansen suggests, vocation does not imply "a 
one-way subordination” to the craft (p.2).
Vocation describes work that is fulfilling and meaningful to the individual, such that 
it helps provide a sense of self, of personal identity. Again, this means that many 
activities can quality as vocational....How'ever....being a teacher would not be vocational 
if the individual kept the practice at arm 's length, divorced from his or her sense of 
identity...[in which case] the person would be merely an occupant o f a role (p.2).
A more important point made by Hansen is that vocation presumes "a hopeful, outward- 
looking sentiment.” a desire to engage the world, and, quoting Dorothy Emmet, "presupposing an 
inner urge to venture and devote oneself in working in a first-hand kind o f way.”
Hansen goes on further to argue that the sense o f vocation is not a "possession” o f its 
holder. There is little o f choice in the matter. "Rather, it is a set o f impulses that are outward- 
looking, and outward-moving, focused on what is "calling" one to act —  impulses that derive 
from awareness o f social practices themselves...The sense o f being impelled from within is 
coterminous with a sense o f being called by something without” (p.3).
O f course it is at this point that we can usefully refer to the idea o f “covenant.’’ It too, 
certainly in its use in the Bible, has a strong element o f compulsion. There is a midrash 
(rabbinical interpretive tale) which illustrates the point well. Before the Hebrews were granted 
the revelation o f the Torah, which would be their way of life for generations to come. God had 
offered this gift/grace/burden to all other nations. These had all, perhaps wisely, declined the 
awesome responsibility o f a partnership with the creator and unique God o f the universe. Finally. 
God makes his “offer” to the Jewish people, but as he does so he holds Mount Sinai over the 
heads o f the entire multitude. Reluctantly, but wisely, they submit to this call “by something 
without.”
Te.iching is about the exercise of a moral agency. The relationship between teacher and 
his or her students is a moral one even if the relationship lacks warmth or rapport. In terms o f a
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personalist pedagogy, the attempt must always be made by the teacher to create and sustain an 
environment o f “caring” and compassion which includes the pedagogical responsibility, but 
which can transcend it. Hansen points out the disposition for service the teacher displays is an 
orientation that “is not so much ideological as it is temperamental” (p.5). The teacher's vocation 
is shaped by its covenantal call which binds him or her to the community o f  learners, and this call 
and covenant have a large degree o f uncertainty.
We recall that even God’s covenant with the Hebrews is, to put it crudely, not a sure 
thing. Uncertainty, the unknown, the unmeasurable, the unpredictable vagaries o f human nature 
are standard themes o f history. The creative responses o f  Judaism to the extraordinary pressures 
throughout the centuries have shaped this remarkable faith community. Similarly, the 
unpredictable, the chaotic, are the leaven within the teaching profession. Hansen points out that 
“those uncertainties, rather than being cause for anxiety, help account for why teaching is such an 
intriguing and attractive endeavor” calling, as it does, for a creative and individual (personal) 
response from every practitioner.
Use o f metaphorical language continues with reference to another covenant, this time the 
Christian one. Writing on how to reconcile communities and dominant institutions through 
readoption o f  “metaphoric roots,” Keiser and Reiser make pertinent observ ations about teaching 
in a personalist mode.
While the Hebrew story is covenant-as-narrative to which the community as a whole is 
bound to the Other (God), the Christian story is covenant-as-relationship with the Other in the 
immediacy o f  personhood. About being teachers, Keiser and Keiser write.
We teach what it is to be a self in the world by embodying an image. We manifest, 
however unwittingly, how to respond to the world —  in defense or openness —  how to 
relate to ideas —  as alluring or threatening; how to respond to each other — 
competitively or cooperatively. We show rather than tell... how to relate to time; 
what to do with the repetitive, the unexpected, our failures, memories, hopes, and the 
cycles o f the year that include low energy and ebullient periods. .And we teach, or fail 
to teach, how to leant to go on learning. Finally, we teach how to deal with any formal 
systems, be it mathematical, scientific, historical, literarv’, or artistic (p. 109-110).
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The personalist curriculum is a means to an end. The curriculum has, as its end, the 
shaping o f a person who can engage others in mature relationships directed towards the 
furtherance o f genuine friendship,as well as the satisfaction o f personal and/or communal needs.
The Question o f the Disciplines
In an eaiiy reappraisal o f John Macmurray’s philosophy, British philosopher Philip 
Conford, writing in Radical Philosophy, makes the observation that the Scotsm an's work makes 
it possible to reassess the typical adult view of children as persons to be molded. Conford 
reminds us that Macmurray teaches that the artistic impulse is present in all people, and 
constitutes the emotional rationality which, when partnered with intellective rationality, makes us 
truly persons.
Conford reminds us that Macmurray said children "are not material to be molded.,.(t)hey 
are potential creators o f society.” (Macmurray, 1935. p.90). Conford argues that this change in 
outlook mandates curricula and methods “capable of educating the emotions.” (Conford. p. 19).
Conford then suggests the following: "...we would need to consider how far the cultural 
environment o f society is a hindrance to the achievement o f such an aim. So the question ceases 
to be philosophical and becomes instead practical, requiring solutions in the educational and 
political spheres” (p.20).
By “philosophical,” Conford means, o f course, “merely theoretical.” He realizes that 
taking seriously the philosophical approach urged by Macmurray implies a commitment to the 
real social change which would be necessary to make personalist pedagogy flower. This is why 
the contribution o f Noddings is so important. She offers a contemporary vision, accessible 
thanks to its grounding in a feminist critique o f society. Now, given a certain openness to such 
arguments in academe and the larger schooling community, it may be possible to influence local 
leadership, professional and lay, toward a pedagogy of caring founded upon M acmurray’s 
personalism. But to work as theory these personalist ideas must sustain and support a curriculum 
which will be recognizable as practical, useful, and relevant. Observes Conford: "This should 
not be surprising after wc have been considering the ideas o f  a philosopher who took the 
unacademic view that the purpose o f thought was indeed to assist us in solving the practical
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problems presented by life” (p .18).
Noddings maintains that to be successful, teachers need to empower students. To do that, 
teachers need to be empowered themselves. They require, she says, "an integrated form of 
education, not a highly specialized education concentrating on one discipline” (1992. p. 178). 
Noddings goes on to write that an overemphasis on the “discipline" character o f curriculum- 
making (specific subjects such as History, Geography, Geometry, etc) detracts from an authentic 
education. While she values expertise, it cannot be permitted to occupy center stage in the 
classroom. In its stead she recommends,
we should strive for a superbly well-trained capacity for inquiry and a Socratic 
willingness to pursue wisdom....It means...that teachers should be willing to discuss 
matters on which they have no specific training —  all the matters pertaining to human 
existence —  and help students to create and learn powerful methods o f investigation 
(p. 178).
A case study on art and education which both Noddings — from a feminist ethic o f care 
—  and Ewens —  from a Macmurrayan personalist perspective —  addressed separately, will 
demonstrate precisely how Macmurray's ideas can shape a relevant, contemporary' pedagogy.
In 1985, the Getty Center for Education in the Arts issued a report on art education. The 
report called for Discipline-Based Art Education, or DBAE. Art education, the report says, 
should comprise aesthetics, art criticism, art history, and art production, and therefore look more 
like, and be structured along lines similar to, those o f  other academic disciplines. Many art 
educators approve o f  these recommendations, according to Noddings (1992, p. 159).
Noddings chooses to address the reports recommendations at length in The Challenge to 
Care in Schools because “its current direction illustrates the major mistakes I have been 
criticizing throughout this book” (p. 159). She considers the recommended changes 
“wrongheaded,” because they go in precisely the wrong direction. She criticizes the approach as 
“highly cognitive (and appealing) to the same linguistic and mathematical/logical capacities that 
support the rest o f the curriculum”(p.l59).
She argues further that "students who are really talented in art will be disenchanted by the 
standard cognitive approach. The people who will do well...are just the people who do well
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generally in academic courses” (p. 161). Noddings articulates her concern in the context o f art as 
being a refuge for many students who cannot adapt easily to cognitive models o f learning. Their 
own aesthetically-grounded styles have gone unrecognized and unappreciated. All the 
disciplines suffer from such a narrow approach. And now the learning o f art will become subject 
to a similar emotional straightjacket if the Getty Center recommendations are widely 
implemented.
But I wonder, if you do this, what will happen to all those young people who for years 
have found the art room the only place in school worth attending, whose interest in art has 
kept them in school long enough to qualify for a chance at life’s standard goods. Of 
course it is clear by now that I reject he disciplinary approach to general education, but 
the example o f art underscores the features that worry me most (p .161).
For his part, Ewens uses Macmurray’s personalism to critique DBAE. He maintains that 
there is a general misunderstanding around the notion o f "discipline.” Ewens broadens his 
approach to include science as well as art since, he argues (using Macmurray’s phrase), both are 
“modes of reflection” ( Ewens. p.3).
Ewens explains Macmurray’s position in the following manner. Science and art share 
commonalities, the first being that they are both activities of reason. O f course we know that 
science is particularly cognitive, while art is closely bound to our emotional states. Ewens 
embraces Macmurray’s understanding o f reason. He argues;
All our reflective activities are rooted in reason, not just our intellectual activities; the 
capacity for self-transcendence (the capacity to act consciously in terms o f  what is not 
ourselves), or objectively, is as characteristic o f our emotional rationality as it is o f our 
intellectual rationality (Ewens, p.4). He has a place for rigor; it is a task and a challenge, 
and its achievement, along with that o f objectivity, “is a sign o f success.”
Art and science are intimately connected, as we know Macmurray maintains. To repeat 
his view, the instrumental use of sense perception is as characteristic o f scientists, as it is of 
artists. The various sciences are ways we have devised for seeking the means to achieve our 
purpose, hence, technology.
But sometimes, says Ewens quoting Macmurray’s argument further, “we live in our
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senses instead o f  using them...[and] the sensuous activity is its own end,” (p.5) [emphasis 
added]. Aesthetic/artistic sense perception is o f  this kind. The arts are sensuous; they 
both derive from, and appeal to, our seeing, hearing, touching, and movement and the 
emotional attunements that undergird them. Our relationship to our senses in the arts is 
thus much more fundamental and profound than it is in the sciences (Ewens. p.5).
Since the relationship is so deep it allows the artist in us, and our students, to attend to 
matters o f fact. .Artists, says Macmurray, are every bit as disciplined in their observations as any 
scientist. “The experience of value is not a different but rather a fuller experience than the 
experience o f the fact which is valued,” Macmurray writes in Religion. Art, and Science ( p.32).
In his application o f Macmurray's personalism, Ewens examines another element which 
should be addressed here, the matter of “contemplation.” M acmurray's language is difficult here, 
but his argument worth following.
Ewens says that "contemplation" has two qualities; "looking” and "reflecting." The first 
is a looking "that intends to know the object itself, not to know about it." This is not scientific 
knowing, but a concentration o f artistic energy "upon the individual existent in all its wondrous 
richness." He then uses M acmurray's words to explain that the artist's looking is "systematic, 
purposeful, critical, and usually prolonged" ( Ewen p.7).
“Reflecting” is inseparable from "looking.” "Knowing is an activity.” he writes, adding; 
The reflective activity of the artist is strikingly different from the exclusively intellectual 
reflective activity o f the scientist...It is not intellectual but emotional (which means) that 
the artist not only apprehends the object as matter o f fact but that he also apprehends it in 
all its affective resonances as good or bad, frightening or alluring, and so on. The 
experience o f valuing something is more inclusive and richer than that o f merely 
apprehending it as a matter o f fact (p.7).
That is why Ewens agrees with Macmurray that persons must trust their emotions and 
feelings even more than they trust their thoughts. Therefore, a pedagogy based on Macmurray's 
personalist principles will seek to educate children in how to use their emotions as tools for 
learning and growing.
Ewens writes that “things cannot be rightly or correctly thought unless they can rightly
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and correctly be felt and, in that sense, rational thought depends on rational feeling” (Ewens, p.
8). This interpretation o f Macmurray’s thought surely meets with Noddings’s approval. In her 
ethics o f  care approach, Nel Noddings has provided an ethical basis for this personalist 
pedagogy, as well as the systematic curriculum structures built around this theme.
In Reason and Emotion, Macmurray writes: “The emotional life is not simply a part or 
an aspect o f human life....It is the core and essence o f human life. The intellect arise out o f it, is 
rooted in it, draws its nourishment and sustenance from it, and is the subordinate partner in the 
human economy” (p.75).
Conclusion
We have considered here the question o f John M acmurray’s contribution to pedagogical 
thought. Our survey o f his philosophical stance, and its comparison to some strands o f 
contemporary theorizing —  particularly Nel Noddings’s ethics o f care —  give a clearer picture of 
M acmurray’s value to thinking about education.
M acmurray's personalism provides the architectonic structure within which specific 
issues in education, such as the concept o f the disciplines in relation to curriculum design, can be 
creatively addressed. In Reason and Emotion Macmurray quotes William Blake's phrase "the 
refinement o f  sensuality” as the aim o f a process o f education where children are taught to feel 
for themselves, as well as to think for themselves. “The emotional life is inherently sensuous.” 
Macmurray points out (1935, p.70).
More broadly, Macmurray’s personalism is trusting, self-reflective, critical, readily 
accessible, and democratic. It opposes positions, particulary postmodern ones, which are distant, 
ironic, suspicious, mired in obscuring language, and solipsistic. A personalist pedagogy founded 
on John Macmurray’s thinking may be called a “pedagogy o f risk,” or a “covenantal pedagogy,” 
since the Other —  and all “others” —  are indispensable to the self.
With Macmurray, we “feel” our way to our own personhood through openness to what 
Macmurray considers the supreme value, friendship.
In friendship we are beyond law and obedience, beyond rales and commandments,
beyond all constraint, in a world o f freedom. But did not Jesus say, 'Y e are my friends
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if ye do whatsoever I command you’? Yes, he did. We, on our side, are apt to miss the 
quiet humour o f his paradoxes. T hese  are my commandments,’ he goes on, "that ye love 
one another.’ In other words, the friendship o f Christ is realised in our friendships with 
one another. His command is that we rise above commandments, and therefore his 
obedience is perfect freedom. Make service your centre, with its laws and duties 
and self-sacrifice, and life is a bondage. Make friendship the centre, and life is 
freedom  {Quaker Faith & Practice, s22.04) [emphasis added].
Macmurray’s philosophy of personalism helps us recognize the moral compass each 
person possesses, and which each can help the other use as we all make our way in a moral, 
because personal, universe. Reinvigorated with the ethics of care advocated by Nel Noddings. 
the personalist stance provided by Macmurray transcends and overcomes the postmodernist 
doubt. It also corrects those positivistic pedagogies which are mired in a misguided 
understanding o f rationality. By stressing the centrality of relationship, a personalist pedagogical 
praxis has as its goal, not only conceptual clarity, or advocacy o f a particular form of school 
organization, but also a transformed, and liberating, way of life.
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APPENDIX A; HISTORICAL SKETCH OF A PERSONAL UNIVERSE
A philosophy o f education which aims at sustaining a particular pedagogical perspective 
has two objectives. It must first ground itself in a wider philosophical field, such as metaphysics, 
and it must detail how much a grounding in theory informs praxis —  the practical aspects o f 
teaching to be informed by the theory. The first element is a necessary broad framework which 
at least suggests that the philosophical ground staked out possesses enough depth and heft to deal 
with a raft o f issues other than the narrow interests of pedagogy. The second is theory-in-action, 
the in situ demonstration that the framework is valid for both its wider purpose and the more 
specialized function it serves when informing pedagogical reflection.
John Macmurray (1891-1976) provides reflective educators with a framework within 
which a rich and compassionate pedagogy may be fashioned. It is grounded, or embedded, in a 
philosophical point o f view called "personalism,” which is devised to contend admirably with 
larger issues, as well as the pressing needs which learners, teachers, and administrators have in 
relating with the cultural contexts most familiar to them. M acmurray's personalism is the 
theoretical framework within which a comprehensive ethic o f care can be sustained.
Personalism is not a form which philosophy takes, nor a particular school o f thought. 
Personalist thinkers o f all stripes, and certainly John Macmurray, maintain that it is the 
fundamental approach or position which philosophical inquiry should take. Personalism seeks to 
analyze the meaning and nature o f all personal existence by setting a priori that the very meaning 
we seek and the very nature we enjoy are to be found in the personal. It is a perspective which 
assumes the validity o f a real, authentic, genuine S e lf . Personalists o f all stripes argue that this 
Self can be explored by philosophical inquiry and its hidden parts exposed to the light by the 
appropriate use o f the human sciences.
To John Macmurray personalism is about action, not discussion, movement, not 
quietism, the practical, not the theoretical. The personal is the hallmark o f being. In his writing, 
academic and popular, and especially in his many broadcasts with the BBC Radio Service in the 
I930's and 40's, Macmurray stressed the necessarily practical effects o f reflecting 
philosophically. But his withdrawal from a purely scholarly career came at a price. "‘The price 
he paid for believing that his subject is about the world, not words, is neglect” (Conford. p. 16).
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Varieties o f Personalism
We need to acknowledge the varied sources o f Personalism because, although this 
examination of Macmurray’s ideas rests on a reading and interpretation o f  his original 
contribution to the field, the overall value o f Personalism to pedagogy can benefit from the 
broader perspective.
The following sketch o f the personalist scene sets the stage for an appreciation o f the 
unique contributions which John Macmurray has made to the field.
Though some personalists are idealists, believing that reality is constituted by 
consciousness, there are also realistic personalists who hold that the natural order is created by 
God and not constituted by human consciousness. While most personalists are theists. there are 
also atheistic personalists. Among the idealists there are absolute personalists. panpsychic 
personalists. ethical personalists, and personal idealists, for whom reality comprises a society o f 
finite persons, or an ultimate person.
On a broad view it is rather difficult to say where the philosophy of personalism begins. 
Some claim that the roots o f the movement go back to the very beginnings o f philosophy itself in 
the Mediterranean basin and the Greeks. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle offered considerations on 
the nature o f  the person. The first more concrete reflections on personhood are found in Boethius 
who famously defines the person "est naturae ratinonalis incJividua substantia ” (“an individual 
substance o f a rational nature”). The list continues through the early Church Fathers, and 
Augustine, to Thomas Aquinas, the Scholastics and neo-Scholastics o f  the Middle Ages, not 
excluding the Muslim thinker Avicenna.
Modernity in philosophical writing may be said to begin roughly with the writings of 
Rene Descartes and Thomas Hobbes (Lavely, 106). It has produced both rationalist and 
empiricist schools o f thought. But this view is quite broad indeed. Narrowing the lens will allow 
us to focus on specific contributions by generations of scholars whose work has helped create the 
contemporary personalist perspectives to include Macmurray’s own version.
Personalism’s current expression has its roots in 19'" century thought amongst European 
philosophers and theologians. Friederich Schleiermacher used the term ' Persnnalismus ’ in his 
Discourses, published in 1799. John Henry Newman, the celebrated light o f the Oxford
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Movement who converted to Roman Catholicism took holy orders and became a cardinal prince 
o f the church, was, by 1830, speaking o f "the method o f personation.” Another British thinker, 
John Grote, called his metaphysical approach "‘personalism” [in Exploratio Philosophica, 1865] 
(Lavely, p. 108).
Something like personalism can be found in the work o f  philosopher-psychologist 
Rudolph Herman Lotze’s work Mikrokosmus (1856-1858), and in psychologist William Stem ’s 
Person und Sache (1906). These thinkers would be enormously influential in shaping the 
personalism found later in the United States. The German tradition o f personalism was advanced 
by phenomenologist Max Scheler (1874-1928). This phenomenological approach to personalism 
was key to the thinking o f several French philosophers later, and, incidentally, to the thought of 
the current Pope, John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla).
The French scene proved one of the most fruitful for personalist thinking. Starting with 
Charles Renouver’s Le Personalisme in 1903, a steady stream o f thinkers produced a coherent 
approach to the human condition which spoke movingly to many. The central figure o f French 
personalism is Emmanuel Mounier who WTOte A personalist manifesto in 1938 and other works 
throughout the 1940's. M ounier’s development as a public intellectual in France during a time of 
great trial is an interesting parallel to John M acmurray's own career as respected popularizer o f 
philosophical, and particularly ethical issues, during the Great Depression and the Second World 
War.
Gabriel Marcel. Jacques Mari tain, and Emmanuel Levinas can all be considered 
personalists. Their intellectual careers in France and on the continent enjoyed a very high profile 
and so their philosophical ideas, whether clearly identified as personalist or not, served as 
patterns arid models for further inquiry. The British scene appeared to be much less receptive to 
personalist trends and this fact served to isolate Macmurray even more than his unorthodox 
commitment to Christianity already had.
Personalism arrived in the United States at the beginning o f the 20'" century. It 
established a foothold at Boston University where it enjoyed preeminent status. The chief o f 
American personalists was Borden Parker Bowne who had studied with Lotze in Germany. The 
Boston School, as it was known, became the principal defender and advocate of personalism in
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the New World, at least among secularists and liberal Protestants. If French personalism was 
closely identified with the Roman Catholic Church and its institutions, the American cousin in 
Masachussetts definitely was not.
Macmurray’s personalism, as with all forms o f personalism, takes personal categories 
seriously. Macmurray declares that, in a technological age, philosophy faces a constant 
temptation to become a techne, a mere technique or formal method which addresses problems of 
no real significance to ordinary’ persons. Compounding the problem, nearly all philosophical 
discourse is carried out using a language inaccessible to most ordinary, intelligent persons. 
Personalists, says Erazim Kohak, maintain that too many philosophers, including those 
interested in educational issues, operate on the unspoken assumption that ultimate reality is 
impersonal. For them, he says, reality is either intrapersonal matter in motion, drives, and 
gratification, such as that found in psychoanalytic schools o f thought, or it is suprapersonal, 
as in a Hegelian interpretation where all are subject to ‘History’ or ‘System’ and where no one 
person can count for anything since all are subject to the impersonal disposition o f History 
(Kohak, p.6).
In other words, personalists tell us that most philosophers say we are manipulated by 
instinctual drives or manipulated by the forces o f destiny. The problems that occupy many 
contemporary philosophers are again not the problems of persons, but problems of textual 
scholarship or o f conceptual systems. The language used to present these matters is usually 
impenetrable; a highly-specialized jargon which may serve some purpose as a professional 
shorthand, yet too often is used as a barrier to prevent access and retain ownership.
Kohak has stated well how personalism denies that discourses o f subpersonal processes 
or superpersonal forces are adequate for capturing the concept o f  the world and the structure o f 
moral reality.
Personalism is a philosophy predicated upon the irreducibility o f personal categories, 
that is, the kind o f categories that govern the meaningful interaction among personal 
beings —  categories o f meaning rather than cause, o f respect rather than force, o f  moral 
value rather than efficacv. of understandinp rather than exnlanation. While we recognize
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that legitimacy o f materialistic categories derived from the metaphor o f matter in 
motion and o f vitalistic categories derived from the metaphor o f need and satisfaction 
o f certain purposes, we regard them as derivative, special case theories legitimate within 
the basic framework o f personal categories. It is moral categories we consider 
epistemologically and ontologically fundamental, not merely a peculiarity o f human 
subjects but most approximating the ultimate structure o f reality (Kohak, p. 8). 
Macmurray, always cognizant o f the obligation which a public intellectual owes the 
community outside academe, developed a style o f communication which incorporated scholarly 
work, formal lectures, writing for the popular press, and radio broadcasting. The personalist 
project is a philosophical reflection, through metaphysics, into the constitution, status and dignity 
o f the human being as person. The dignity and value o f the person reside at the very center of 
Macmurray’s philosophy, and provide the foundation for all his subsequent philosophical 
analysis: the meaning o f history, the value o f science, the play o f religion, and the maintaining of 
order in civil society. Macmurray’s interpretation o f this "personalist universe' shows us how 
persons becomes autonomous moral agents through the interplay o f subjectivity and autonomy. 
Macmurray’s personalist perspective is also a theological anthropology. Although various o f its 
parts or elements may be detached and examined for their contributions to other disciplines, i.e. 
political science, sociology, and historiography, our concern here is with the value o f persons. To 
Macmurray such value is grounded in a theistic understanding o f human action in history'.
Anthropology is the science that deals with the origin, development, and customs of 
humankind. Theological anthropology has precisely the same interests, but narrows the focus to 
a central concern for the human person and the transcendent qualities which each person shares 
with others, and with God. Subjectivity and autonomy, human d'gnitv', person-within- 
community, participation and solidarity, all are themes proper to inclusion within the discipline 
of theological anthropology. Cultural perspectives and value-making are recognized as having 
both immanent and transcendent qualities. It would be impossible to appreciate John 
Macmurray’s authentic contribution to pedagogy without accepting that these insights are 
grounded in a theistic personalist perspective. In any event, Macmurray did not doubt that the 
split between philosophy and theology was quite unnatural. As he writes in Religion, Art, and
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Science, the division between the two disciplines is “accidental” (p.70) and, further, an authentic 
philosophy should issue in a new kind o f “natural theology” (1961, p. 224).
But before philosophical reflection and analysis comes that huge collection o f human 
experiences and experiments called “history.” As a Christian, albeit an unorthodox one, 
Macmurray understood human history to have meaning. This meaning is worked out through 
time and space and allows a consciousness o f purpose to be recognized by persons acting as 
singulars or, more frequently and creatively, in communion. Specific civilizations have played 
their part in this eschatological drama.
The Historical Triad
In his The Clue to History Macmurray outlines how the historical development o f the 
Jewish, Greek and Roman civilizations in the Western world has produced conditions 
appropriate for the rise o f personalism. Our cultural heritage is composed o f all those institutions 
created to administer empires and states, the services designed to address the needs of 
populations and, with the rise o f the nation-state, the citizenry, and o f course the ecclesiastical 
communities charged with the most important message o f all, as Macmurray saw it, the 
continued transmission and further elaboration o f the redemptive power o f God’s real action in 
the world.
Macmurray argues that an understanding o f history is necessary for a true appreciation o f 
the value, place and agency o f the human person. Histor>' is a process which has inherent 
meaning because o f its revelational quality. It is both more and less than we imagine.
History, to borrow a definition, is a systematic discipline which aims at producing a 
knowledge o f  past human experience as a whole continuous with the present. The proper object 
o f  study is human action (Harris, p. 456). Events matter to the historian primarily because they 
comprise the ground upon which human persons act as willing agents. There is an understanding 
that those events can themselves act upon persons, o f course, so although they are derivative o f 
human willing and purposing and therefore secondary, they are still important.
History is, in its own way, like philosophy (and for analogous reasons), all-inclusive.
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Its ideal is to present the past as if it were the complete and adequate memor>' o f a single 
experiment. “As memory is by its very nature integral to present experience,” writes Harris, in a 
review of Macmurray’s The S e lf as Agent, “the continuity o f the past with the present is essential 
for history.” Furthermore, Harris adds.
And it seeks not only to chronicle but also to understand this past, which it can do 
only by comprehending the continuity o f  human intention exhibited in a multitude 
o f past acts both with one another and with the present (p.456-457).
Harris continues by pointing out that this approach gives us a “model for a metaphysical 
conception o f the world as one action.” At this point in The S e lf os Agent Macmurray points out 
that action is the integration o f the movement o f the agent with those o f the Other, (the Other 
being God or other persons) so that they form a unity which is intended.
There is a useful visual imagery available to us for a better understanding o f that play of 
historical forces and ideas which Macmurray examined. Imagine a Venn diagram with three 
interlocking circles, each one representing a civilizational grouping. The point where they meet 
is the personalist perspective. It is a point o f integration where the values each culture brings is 
harmoniously integrated. The three civilizations which have largely shaped the Western world 
are the Hebrew, the Greek, and the Roman. Each civilization brought out or nurtured qualities o f 
action which have been brought down to we contemporaries. The instruments used var>' from 
purely abstract ideas, such as varieties o f philosophical speculations, and legal concepts, to the 
instrumentalities o f science and technology. Macmurray saw three very different civilizations 
with very different qualities.
The Biblical Covenant
The Hebrew civilization was religious, communal, and practical. The Greek civilization 
was theoretical and aesthetic. The Roman civilization was technical and pragmatic.
Macmurray is not saying that the ancient culture o f the Jews could not be pragmatic, or that the 
Greeks o f the Periclean period were not communal, nor that no Roman creatively provided the
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and important traits evident to us in our observation o f the past o f these cultures allows us to
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conclude that each civilization had its own particular mix of genius.
The “personalist balance” which Macmurray tries to strike in his writing is found in an 
understanding o f how this triad of civilizational qualities operate today, within both individual 
persons and the communities which they come together to create. Macmurray did not regard the 
ancient Hebrew view o f  human existence, and its corporate expression o f covenantal existence, 
to be primitive in any derogatory way. The Hebraic expression o f society necessitated the 
combination o f two constituent elements that in forms o f  communal life elsewhere were usually 
kept apart: the idea o f sacredness, and the concept o f personhood expressed as a form of 
citizenship inseparable from membership in a religious or spiritual community.
For Macmurray, no primitive society has, properly speaking, civilization as such. The 
ancient Hebrew religion and culture o f Israel were integrated. There was no distinction between 
the religious and secular aspects o f life. In short, there was no “atomization of life.” no 
damaging division. Ancient Judaism, the Judaism of the generative era when the Torah was 
taking shape, when the sophisticated approach to legal interpretation found in the Talmud was in 
its first stages, was the environment which provided a way of living the whole o f life.
Particular modes o f thinking about the world, o f interpreting the human (Hebrew or Gentile) 
were instrumentalities serving much larger purposes. Thought was therefore "always subordinate 
and contributory to action,” (1938, p.29). God was a living God related primarily to the 
problematics o f existence, not of conceptuality. As Hwa Yol Jung (1970) has commented, “for 
Macmurray religion represents something whole and truly living...[and he would] consider the 
Old Testament not a collection o f static theological doctrines but rather a dynamic testimony of 
the community o f men in their living relation to the absolute Other (p.539). The idea o f the 
covenant is central. A covenant, though it may be interpreted as a legal instrumentality with a 
practical purpose only, enjoys a much richer texture when placed in its Biblical context, just the 
context in which Macmurray valued it. While the Hebrew covenantal relationship obviously 
included legally-grounded obligations, was contractual in nature, the basic and underlying value 
was that o f trust. The creator o f the universe is trustworthy; the word o f God can be counted 
upon.
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The foundational quality for relationships between persons is friendship, says 
Macmurray. The friendship between the Creator and his Chosen People, the Hebrews, is 
symbolic o f what Macmurray will always mean when he uses the term friendship. This friendship 
is multifaceted and deep and is much closer to a theologian’s use o f a term such as "agape" or 
■philia,’ terms reserved to discuss aspects o f the relationship between human persons and God.
To Macmurray, the Biblical covenant o f the Jews with God is a perfect example o f  the action 
orientation that authentic friendship adopts. “Friendship is a community o f souls. Two souls 
enter into a union and form one whole “ (1936, p. 45). The Mosaic covenant is the 
instrumentality through which the Jewish people, in the individual and in the collective,—  bound 
themselves to God. Breaking o f the covenant could be accomplished by either a personal or 
national betrayal. The Pentateuch and historical books o f the Bible are replete with examples o f 
both. Betrayal, again either in personal or collective terms, constituted sin, "that wjong which 
breaks fellowship between persons. W hatever brings two persons into contradiction or opposition 
with one another is sin” (1936, p. 45). And almost always the sin is the absence o f  action, rather 
than a lack o f belief. Intellectual assent to the giveness o f God hardly figures at all in the matter. 
The outrage God is said to feel is based on the absence o f righteousness, the not-doing o f the 
right thing. The offence may be the refusal to carry out a seemingly harmless task, say a minor 
sacrifice, or the more serious matter o f not providing hospitality to strangers, but it appears 
always to be based on the absence o f  action on the part one o f the parties to the covenant. Action, 
for Macmurray too, is intimately connected to friendship, the supreme covenantal relationship.
Martin Buber once remarked that “God does not make theological statements.” God in 
Macmurray’s understanding is not a theological concept or merely an object of thought. God is 
an agent. In fact, God is Action itself. God has covenanted with Israel. God has concluded an 
understanding with the Jewish people which is both legal and personal in character and quality. 
Their is a reciprocity at work which provides the parties with mutuality o f satisfaction. 
Macmurray considers that God is primarily a worker and thus must be understood in terms o f 
action. Ancient Jewish culture never believed in leisure or contemplation as the goal o f life, for 
the world is God’s very act. In M acmurray’s view the Jewish view is the correct one: God and 
human persons are creators, indeed, co-creators.
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Not only is God primarily an agent but man also is primarily homo agens rather 
than homo sapiens. Reflection or knowledge arises from and is always related to the 
problematics o f everyday action or nexus o f interpersonal relations. For Macmurray, 
reflection, as a matter o f fact, is a temporary suspension o f living and thinking is not 
living at all (Jung, p. 542).
Macmurray admired Jewish tenacity and resilience in the face o f the millenia-long 
Diaspora. This “nation” was itself comprised o f peoples belonging to dozens o f different cultures 
and cultural subgroups. Speaking different languages, living under vastly different regimes 
within startingly dissimilar social structures, they nonetheless kept a central or core tradition 
alive. The Jews were also able to demonstrate the two principles o f  unity he suggests are 
necessary to maintain the cohesiveness o f society: fellowship and co-operation. The articulation 
o f law and the practice o f religious obligations varied somewhat from region to region. However, 
what the Tradition was comprised o f maintained a high degree o f uniformity amongst scholars 
across the world. Macmurray could argue that the integrating factor was "friendship.” as he 
applied the word.
He draws the inference that religion cannot be idealist because the Jews were not 
idealists. Conford writes that Macmurray saw idealism as seeking "to remove the possibility o f a 
just society from this world” (Conford. p. 19). The human project is precisely to achieve such a 
just society worldwide. The Judaeo-Christian tradition, when it fails to seek justice on earth, 
betrays itself. The seeking o f justice for all beings within human purview was not an objective 
sought by the Greeks and Romans.
Athens and Rome
In Conditions o f  Freedom, Macmurray explains how the development of the primitive 
group towards civilizations inevitably dissociates the two bases o f unity. Fellowship and co­
operation no longer define the same group. Macmurray argues that the institution o f slavery is a 
primary reason for the deterioration o f fellowship. Slave populations are not generally considered 
part o f the spiritual unity o f fellowship which characterizes the dominant group during its rise. 
Slaves are included as co-operating members o f society because o f their usefulness to the
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economic stability of the state; they are excluded from the spiritual fellowship. With the rising o f 
a strongly agricultural economy and increased urbanization comes territorial boundaries and an 
impetus to the growth o f the idea o f property in land. Increases in trade and other forms o f 
exchange further complicate, even compromise, both types o f unity.
This process is well exemplified in the history o f ancient Greece, and it produced 
the situation which created the imperialism first o f  Macedon and then o f Rome: and in the 
city states of Greece, as in H itler's Germany, it gave rise to the reactionary ideal o f ’self- 
sufficiency,’ the vain effort to re-establish the primitive coincidence o f co-operation and 
fellowship within the territorial limits o f political independence (p.42-43).
Understanding Greek civilization provided Macmurray with another perspective on the 
human project and one writer has been correct to say Macmurray’s aim is to “de-hellenize” 
Christianity (Jung, p.533), at least philosophically.
The Greek genius lay in contributing speculative thought and the beginnings o f science to 
the world. The contribution to communal life is less ambitious, according to Macmurray. He 
argues the Greeks maintained local structures that integrated fellowship. This worked on a small 
scale, in an exclusivist manner. Any free person not part o f the collective o f the city-state, any 
outsider, could not be part o f the fellowship, which was as important spiritually as it was civilly. 
Its effectiveness was in its proximity; there was no applying the communal structure o f 
the Greek city-state to any larger conception o f community. As argued earlier, the Greeks could 
not accommodate themselves creatively to the political and social implications o f  burgeoning 
economies and large slave populations; both conditions leading to unanticipated connections.
Roman ideals provide, like Greek ones, some useful contributions to the building o f the 
just society, but they offer more in the way o f an object lesson on the use o f fear and teiror.
In Conditions o f  Freedom, Macmurray draws his conclusion as to the value o f Roman gifts.
The Romans created...the modem idea o f the State, as a unity o f society based wholly 
upon law and administration, and so providing a framework within which co-operation 
can be organized and developed. The State, so conceived and constructed, has pragmatic 
justification only. It is not concerned with culture, with units o f fellowship, except in so 
far as they threaten to disrupt the system of co-operation which it maintains. Its business
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in this field is the negative one o f “keeping the peace” (p.54).
The Romans opt for this policy after abandoning the attempt to combine the two 
principles o f unity. The Roman unity is one o f “organized co-operation within which religious 
and cultural toleration allows older unites o f  fellowship to maintain themselves and new forms of 
fellowship to develop autonomously” ( p.43). Efficiency, then, becomes the most valued 
principle, the yardstick by which all else is measured and “not the binding force o f  a sense of 
fellowship which is direct and personal” (p.44). Part o f the efficiency is to combine the symbols 
o f the state with that o f religion. The twinning carries over from Imperial Rome to the Christian 
era. The Christian Church, as the now-dominant social institution in the West, patterns itself after 
its predecessor. Rome was deified, its Emperor become the personal symbol o f  the State. 
Eventually Christianity is adopted for similar reasons, as a unifying factor.
So there was created, in the society o f  the Roman Empire, what has remained the ideal 
pattern o f social unity for West-European civilization. The two principles o f human unity 
are recognized as functionally separate. Church and State are charged with the care o f the 
inner and the outer unity o f society respectively (p.44).
The Church’s original mission was to transform the unity of co-operation into a unity of 
fellowship. The fall of the Roman Empire reversed the situation and the Church then fought to 
reestablish the unity o f co-operation. The spiritual unification o f Europe was the point o f 
Christendom. Its political expression in the Holy Roman Empire was not successful, however 
and when the medieval world gave way to the modem, writes Macmurray, “the new, protestant 
forms o f religion shrank within the framework o f the new independent states and modem 
nationalism was bom” (p.44).
Macmurray outlines the current difficulty in creating an effective framework for “world-
unity,”
We should remember the relative dissociation of fellowship and co-operation in the 
process o f  social development, and the variety o f possibilities which their interrelation 
affords. In particular, we should recognize and oppose, in our own modes o f thought and 
speech, the atavism wich infects our modem tradition, and which has been so powerfully 
reinforced by the influence o f biological and evolutionary metaphors. The organic
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society, with its fusion of co-operation and fellowship on a basis o f blood-relationship, 
lies not at the end, but at the beginning o f history. It is what we are moving away from. 
The patterns of unity in fellowship no longer coincide with or correspond to the political 
patterns o f  economic co-operation. Nor is it either possible or necessary that they 
should (1949, p. 45).
"Growth,” “development,” “symbiotic,” "organic” ; these are words drawn from the 
vocabulary o f the life sciences, the various disciplines subsumed under the heading o f biology. 
They are frequently used in all manner o f contexts, often outside o f strictly scientific 
applications. A child can be said to “thrive” and ‘‘grow,” “develop” and “ripen.” Macmurray 
spent considerable time reflecting upon the metaphoric uses to which scientific terms are put.
We will see later how the unreflective use o f such terms helps create an intellectual and 
bureaucratic environment which persistently misreads human needs. This misunderstanding o f 
the human condition, as Macmurray saw it, was epitomized by Western philosophy's critical 
mistake; the undercutting o f the "personal'’ with the adoption o f  Cartesian dualism.
.At this point we turn to what British radical philosopher Philip Conford, an admirer o f 
the Scottish metaphysician, termed Macmurray's “Copemican revolution" in philosophy.
Macmun av and Rene Descartes
Despite his many references to God and the ultimate meaning o f the Christian movement 
through history, John Macmurray’s personalism is not strictly, or exclusively, Christian. The 
proper question, to Macmurray, is not, “Does God exist?” but rather, "Is what exists personal?” 
The question could be asked another way: “Is the universal Other, from which the community o f  
persons distinguishes itself, and which is the same for all persons, a personal or impersonal 
Other?” (1961,215). In other words. Does the universe have authentic and genuine meaning for 
persons? Is it only an object o f observation, an arena for our cognitive faculties? May it not also, 
and principally, be the context in which we receive our meaning as living beings?
Macmurray obviously understands the need for questions. Revising previously held 
views must he undertaken once these views are no longer compatible with the best available, 
legitimately-gathered evidence. But the philosophical project cannot succeed with reason alone.
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at least not with the sort of “reason” as has come to be accepted by the philosophically 
sophisticated since the impact o f Rene Descartes (1596-1650).
From the start o f  his public life as a philosopher in the 1930's, Macmurray argued 
for a realistic assessment o f philosophy’s potential for advancing human understanding and 
happiness. Fie also cautioned about the innate limits o f  the discipline.
The study o f philosophy is apt to resolve itself into an experience o f progressive 
disillusionment. Ever since Socrates awoke to the vision o f his own ignorance and 
proclaimed that at last he knew that he knew nothing, his successors have found 
themselves liable to the same humiliating discovery. They have found that the most 
painstaking endeavours to find the truth brought them no nearer to the knowledge which 
they set out to explore, and that all they had earned by the sleepless labour was the 
bedevilment of the certainties with which they started. It is the experienced 
philosopher, not the novice, who finds him self entangled in the question, "What is 
philosophy, and how does one set about it?’' (1933, p.7).
Macmurray is not calling for the abandonment o f the philosophical project. Far from it. 
But he does know that all to often a lack o f humility and an over-supply o f hubris have excited a 
zeal in one theoretical direction or other. To be blunt: the first point for Macmurray is that 
philosophy has to be useful; its purpose is to serve human beings as they travel life's journey.
The second point is connected to the first. Valuable as sound philosophical reflection is, it is 
second to action. An easily-recognizable Macmurrayan theme is that the viia contemplativa 
must serve the interests o f the vita activa. Philosophy is directed toward action and has a 
practical end.
With Rene Descartes, French mathematician and philosopher, European philosophy 
found itself on the cusp of a new age. The verities o f medieval scholasticism had long been 
wearing thin when Descartes' Discourse on M ethod appeared on the scene.
Descartes is credited with introducing a highly-theoretical skepticism regarding the 
assertion o f doctrinal verities. He challenged orthodoxy’s claims upon the human mind by 
fhrmiilafing a senes n f nile.s designed to reinforce individual critical reflection on received values 
and truths, propositions and assertions, and even physical reality. Descartes maintained that the
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method of doubt must be universally applied, with even the evidence o f  the senses rejected as 
uncertain. The real existence o f one’s own body may be questioned as illusion or dream. Yet 
there is a foothold. I who doubt, says the Cartesian, I who am deceived, at least while I doubt, I 
must exist, and, as doubting is thinking, it must be true that while I think, I am. (The famous 
Latin formulation is Cogito, ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am.”) The certainty Descartes 
recognizes is o f the self-evident individual. From this cornerstone Descartes derives all 
philosophical propositions.
The idea o f God, he argues, implies the real existence o f God. No finite or imperfect 
being like man could have produced the idea o f an infinite or perfect being. God has revealed 
himself to humankind. Since the body can be so easily doubted, and yet the mind self-evidently 
enjoys real existence, it must be that the two are radically distinct. The body is subject to 
mechanistic or biological explanations. Descartes famously observes that animals, not sharing 
with human beings the qualities o f “mind,” are mere automatons subject to instinctual reflexes 
and drives.
Finally, the universe consists of two different substances: minds, or thinking substance, 
and matter, which is basically quantitative and theoretically explainable in scientific laws, 
procedures, and mathematical formulas. Only in human beings are the two, mind and matter, 
joined. Thus Cartesian dualism is introduced into the vocabulary o f the Western mind.
There is no doubt Rene Descartes’s was a bold statement for human emancipation. It was 
an intellectual tour de force which enabled others to pursue creative avenues o f thought, 
particularly in scientific research. The distancing which it provided to the observer from that 
which is observed proved useful to the carrying out o f  practical research. The subject-object 
dichotomy was now in place.
But as subsequent intellectual history illustrates, the Cartesian idea o f radical doubt or 
skepticism soon developed into a program which probably outstripped the intentions o f its 
originator. A methodical doubt came to be applied to the very ideas o f purpose and meaning 
themselves and not merely to the intellectual instrumentalities created to de^'elop or explore 
them.
By the time Macmurray came on the scene, much of British, Continental and American
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
philosophy was still being formulated within a Cartesian context, either in assumption o f that 
context’s complete validity, or in some degree o f opposition to it. Descartes had certainly set the 
agenda. Macmurray did not accept the Cartesian cogito as the most appropriate or even a 
sufficient starting point for philosophizing. He did not deny its importance or significance, 
merely its validity. The cogito had been singularly influential amongst thinlrers for centuries, 
especially in many if  not most quarters o f the scientific community. It would not be lightly 
dismissed. Macmurray acknowledged that Descartes had recognized an authentic philosophical 
problem and had addressed it creatively, if erroneously.
The problem of logical representation o f the self has been a central problem of modem 
philosophy. Macmurray argues that by representing the self as a substance in terms o f a schema 
o f mathematical thought, Descartes is thereby making the “se lf’ something which can be 
“thought about” and “manipulated.” Cartesians miss the mark completely. They turn person into 
thing; person into object, (1933, p .122-123). Elsewhere Macmurray criticizes all forms of 
idealism as damaging to the integrity of the human experience. Their error, he argues, is that 
idealist philosophers always divide the physical from the emotional/spiritual.
Now to make the reflective activity primary in such a fashion necessitates a dualist 
philosophy, as one can see both in Plato and in Descartes. ‘Body’ and ‘Soul’, in Plato 
or ’Matter’ and ‘Mind’, in Descartes exclude one another. This implies that the life 
o f  the mind...any reflective activity, is self-contained and has no inherent reference 
to practical activity or to the bodily life. It has its meaning in itself, and so must be 
understood in terms o f itself. In action I am in direct contact with the things which I 
perceive, I operate upon them. But when I reflect, I ’withdraw into m yself, and I 
operate upon ideas —  either Platonic ‘forms’, which are non-sensible objects o f 
aesthetic contemplation, or ‘concepts’ as they are for Descartes (1961, p.46).
The main offence in both Plato and Descartes, and with idealist thinkers generally o f 
course, is that they isolate thought, divorce it from action, provide it with a working space which 
for Macmurray is unreal because it is detached from lived experience, in other words, artificial. 
If, he adds, “theoretical reflection is a solitary activity” then it assumes an appropriate [meaning 
evident] separation from other persons. No such separation is justifiable. In particular, it
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deprives religion o f  its proper claim upon human action.
It [idealism] leaves no room for religion as a mode o f reflection at all. For at the heart 
of religion there lies an activity o f communion and fellowship. Unless we have persons 
in relation there is no fellowship; for whatever else fellowship entails it entails a union or 
togetherness o f separate individual people. The withdrawal into reflection, if it is an 
entry into a purely spiritual world...is a withdrawal from fellowship, and so from the 
experience which constitutes the central point o f religious experience (1961, p.47)
The religious moment o f personhood will be examined in some detail later. The reference 
to the singular importance o f fellowship for Macmurray is important for what it suggests about 
the creation o f community generally, and learning environments such as schools specifically. 
There are significant pedagogical implications which arise from M acm urray's ideas about 
“fellowship” and, especially, “friendship.”
The entire approach which claims superiority for cognitive functioning, or rationalism is 
not exclusive to Descartes. Macmurray the historian saw the rise o f the physical sciences, 
particularly astronomy, from the late Renaissance on as matched, step-by-step, with 
philosophical developments, with Rene Descartes and later David Hume as primary examplars o f 
the latter. Thinking becomes o f primary significance and the models o f human behaviour which 
it leads to are mechanical, instinctual, almost automatic. The approach is strengthened as 
experimental science meets with increasing success. Macmurray labeled this mode o f viewing 
human experience as “the mechanical metaphor.”
Macmurrav and Jean-Jacques Rousseau
A response to this mechanical view of things made its presence felt in the work o f 
thinkers, both philosophers and scientists, who believed in rationalist methodology but 
disbelieved the conclusions which had satisfied earlier investigators.
The Romantic movement in Europe was characterized by an investment in feeling and 
emotion. If  the truths discoverable by science could not be denied, they still could not provide 
persons with reasons for living. Such reasons can be found principally in the appreciation of 
beauty, wherein lies truth. Forms of creativity and spontaneity, especially through exaltation o f
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the self, the perspective o f the artist rather than that o f  the scientist are hallmarks o f the romantic 
temperament.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) epitomizes the Romantic personality. His work, 
Emile, is a charter for a form of education which stresses the careful adaptation o f the 
individual’s developing needs and so follow "the natural progress o f  the human heart.”
Rousseau, like Romantics everywhere, believed in the innate goodness o f people and that evil is 
a social construct. The purpose o f education was to allow the natural to occur, for the child to 
evolve into the being which Nature intended it to be. Like gardeners who gather wild flowers 
then manipulate them through domestication, so had education, traditionally, taken what was 
natural and “given” and molded it into artificialities, (“Magistrates, priests, and gentlemen,” as 
Rousseau would have observed).
Macmurray understood the Romantics as creating another metaphor for the human 
person, this time an “organic” one which stands in opposition to the "mechanical” one. The 
organic view has developed such a comprehensive view of persons and society, has provided 
such elaborate structures o f interpretation that it has dominated virtually all forms o f reflection 
about persons.
Its influence was intensified and broadened by the development of evolutionary 
biology, and the consequent popularizing o f  evolutionary modes o f thinking beyond the 
strictly biological field..,.[W]e tried to understand the world, human history and society, 
by means o f biological metaphors (1961, p. 49-50).
This has not been entirely beneficial. Macmurray explains that an inappropriate response 
to the claims o f  biological science by “foolish and misguided ecclesiastics and others” created a 
contest o f wills which religion was perhaps bound to lose. The church presented believers with 
an either-or proposition. Either they remained loyal to the truth o f human existence as 
interpreted by dogma, or they repudiated the certitudes o f the church —  and the possibility o f 
salvation —  in order to embrace the new thinking. The consequences were devastating for the 
church, and they were just about as devastating for the health o f science and philosophy
According to Maçrnnrray, “If wp use [the concept o f Nature] to cover ail the world n f nvir 
empirical experience, then we leave...out...all that distinguishes us from animals, all that is more
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than biological in human life, all that makes us persons and our experience a personal 
experience” (1961, p.50). This position is not entertained because Macmurray is reluctant to 
provide the spirit o f  scientific enquiry with a proper place in human life. Quite the contrarj'. 
Macmurray himself was deeply respectful o f science, having devised a novel scheme of studies 
while an undergraduate student. University regulations at the time maintained that a student 
could be enroled in either Arts or the Sciences, but not both simultaneously. A precocious young 
Macmurray finagled his way past those obstructive rules and created for himself a program which 
allowed him to read both philosophy and geology. It is reported that he bested the science 
students at their own discipline.
He would later write that “science will go on, and should go on. It is only at the beginning 
of its triumphs. It seems particularly important to me that the social sciences should be 
encouraged and that their conclusions should be put to practical use” (1961, p.28).
When writing about mother-and-child relations in Persons in Relation. Macmurray makes 
a telling argument against the organic metaphor. “It was assumed.” he writes,” that this way of 
conceiving human life is scientific and empirical and therefore the truth about us. It is in fact not 
empirical; it is a priori and analogical...it is not, in the strict sense, even scientific” (1961, p.45). 
Extrapolating from data gathered during the study o f animals and plants cannot apply to humans 
except analogically. Analogies cannot be the truth, per se. The implications for making the 
analogy the truth about persons are most damaging, Macmurray avers.
The practical consequences are in the end disastrous; but they do reveal the erroneous 
character o f the assumption. To affirm the organic conception in the personal field is 
implicitly to deny the possibility o f action; yet the meaning o f the conception lies in its 
reference to action. We can only act upon the organic conception by transforming it into a 
determinant o f  our intention. It becomes an ideal to be achieved. We say, in effect, 
‘Society is organic; therefore let us make it organic, as it ought to be.’ The contradiction 
is glaring. If society is organic, then it is meaningless to say that it ought to be. For if it 
ought to be, then it is not (1932, p .5 6 ) .
He points out further that an organic view o f  people ends in the creation o f  “the 
totalitarian state.” Macmurray strenuously maintains that "we are not organisms, but persons”
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and the complex o f human relationships created in the webbing o f society is not organic but 
personal.
Human behaviour cannot be understood, but only caricatured, if it is represented as an 
adaptation to environment; and there is no such process as social evolution but, instead, a 
history which reveals a precarious development and possibilities both of progress and o f 
retrogression (1961, p. 46).
There are two “modes of reflection” in which persons engage. One is the “emotional 
mode” and the other “the intellectual mode,” or science. Science, Macmurray says in The S e lf as 
Agent, is “a determination of the World-as-means” (p. 198). It is an instrumentality which allows 
us to categorize and analyze the forms of order and disorder which we find in the natural world.
In reference to action [Macmurray’s chief value] it provides an improvement in our 
technical knowledge, in particular by the great extension o f anticipation which it makes 
possible. By means o f systematic intellectual reflection, and its expression in generalized 
information, we discover increasingly what we may count on. with greater or less 
probability, as the support for our actions, or as the means to the realization of our 
intentions (1961, p. 198).
Because o f its status as an instrument, science cannot provide persons or communities 
with values. It is “completely unbiased, unemotional, disinterested” (1932, p. 15), and has no 
purpose “except to understand facts.” As an “ indifferent” instrumentality it can serve either good 
or evil ends. Actions “cannot be disinterested [because] action depends on what we want, on our 
choice o f what is worth doing” (1932, p.23).
The Response o f Idealism
One o f the most effective challengers to Cartesianism was the Prussian philosopher 
Immanuel Kant. Macmurray maintains that Kant’s Critical philosophy came closest, among 
philosophies o f the modem period, in creatively engaging Descartes’s work, and in bringing 
balance back to the philosophical enterprise.
However. Macmurray argues that Kant was ultimately unsuccessful because his own 
version o f idealism could not provide a satisfactory reconciliation between the private and public
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aspects o f personhood.
Kant objects to the attempts by Descartes or the British empiricists, such as David Hume, 
to use, in the first case pure reason, and in the second case sense experience to understand 
knowing (epistemology). Kant maintains that sense experience is necessary in order to recognize 
the presence o f a real object "out there’, and that inner categories o f the mind (reason) allow the 
perceiver to understand what the object is. Kant appears to combine elements o f both modes of 
perception. Despite this, knowing is a complicated thing because. Kant argues, we know only- 
through categories which exist in our mind, not because o f anything in the object perceived. This 
means that we can never know things 'in them selves’. We can deal with and understand the 
world o f  phenomena, our everyday reality, but not the 'noum enal' world, the authentic world 
which is behind the phenomenal world.
Knowledge is a combination, or synthesis o f what we can know about the world of 
phenomena, and those concepts o f thought which we then impose on the perceived phenomena in 
order to give it meaning. We are always looking for connections and patterns.
Kant's inability to reconcile the object perceived with our understanding o f  it as "the thing 
itse lf’ poses a real problem to Macmurray. There remains the bifurcation between the 
understanding or comprehending mind, and all that exists which that mind can perceive. 
Macmurray words his objections this way:
Knowledge is, in some sense, the discovery o f what exists independently o f any activity of 
ours. If we construct our knowledge, if it depends at all upon a spontaneous, inventive 
activity o f the mind, then there is no escape from the conclusion that we can never know 
the world as it is in itself, independently o f our ways o f apprehending it...Reality as it is in 
itself is unknowable. This is the famous doctrine o f the Thing-in-itself, o f the noumenal 
world, and it is Kant’s denial o f knowledge (1957, p.46).
There is an intolerable condition created, as Macmurray sees it, if  the real world o f our 
senses cannot be apprehended and comprehended completely by our minds. The Kantian 
perspective condemns the person to alienation from lived experience no less so than does a 
Cartesian point o f view. Macmurray says both their points o f view are errors. Kant continues the 
dualism by insisting upon the person as thinker. The alternative, Macmurray points out, is to
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overthrow the view o f person as thinker, and install the person as agent, to move the ground of 
philosophy from thought to action.
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APPENDIX B: RELIGION-AS-LIBERATION, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY
Religion as a Form of Liberation
At the core, the very heart o f John M acmurray’s philosophical perspective o f personalism 
is the belief summarized in this statement from his The S e lf as Agent. All meaningful 
knowledge is for the sake of action and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship.
Friendship, community, and the spiritual perspective which informs the relationship 
between them is precisely how “meaningful knowledge” is created so as to permit “meaningful 
action” to take place. Conceptual thinking about friendship, community, and religion or 
spirituality are treated at great length by Macmurray, and they are central to his program. A 
survey o f these ideas is useful for our purposes, as each idea looms large in the formulation of 
any pedagogy informed by Macmurray’s thought.
There are several purposes to what Macmurray calls 'friendship.' The first is that 
friendship, which can also be called love, makes us truly human persons. The second purpose o f 
friendship, or love, is to enable persons who can love to create communities. The third function 
o f friendship is to being single persons, through communities and the building up o f 
communities, with God. This triad o f person-person, person-community, person-God is 
recognizable in most other forms o f personalism. This perspective tends toward theism.
All creative human relationships, including the building of community, are embedded in a 
properly understood religious matrix. Despite the pluralism and cultural relativism which are 
now hallmarks o f contemporary Western culture, the vocabulary o f Christianity still has the 
power to evoke and provoke. The Christian interpretation o f history and its analysis o f culture 
are part o f Macmurray’s personalist philosophy-making and they are here used to further his 
arguments.
The function o f religion is to extend the family unit’s monopoly o f affection towards its 
members into ever widening circles, so that greater numbers o f persons can be included within a 
community inspired by philia  —  love o f  brothers and sisters —  and agape —  love o f God. 
Macmurray goes on to argue, in Reason and Emotion, that the authentic mission o f religion is 
compromised when its vision is circumscribed from the social to the individual, or he realm of 
the private. If  the privatization o f religion occurs, as is typical o f any society which has become
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secularized, then religion is no longer “a matter o f real mutuality,” but becomes instead “a 
relation o f the individual in reflection to his own ideals and aspirations,” (1936, p. 102). Religion 
is no longer the vital, living force which helps persons make communities, but a form of 
narcissism perhaps harmless in itself, but now hampering mutuality.
The trinity of concepts mentioned earlier, (person-person, person-society, person-God), is 
a mirror reflection of the Holy Trinity which is the central symbol o f God for all forms of 
Christianity, ancient or contemporary. Eastern or Western. The relationships which the Holy 
Persons enjoy with each other within the Godhead have long served as exemplary models to 
express deep-rooted needs. For centuries the Church has explored this model, applying it to the 
formation o f political and spiritual communities. The exploration o f the “person” o f Jesus and 
the “event” o f Christ has long been studied through the theological discipline o f Christology. 
Understandings o f “friendship” and “community” from these sources will be used to illustrate the 
general personalist perspective.
For Macmurray, it is axiomatic that persons not only live in relationship with each other, 
but the very reality o f persons qua persons is defined by these very same relationships. Another 
personalist philosopher offers an insight which does justice to M acmurray's own views, 
especially those which he expresses about Christianity in his book. The M eaning o f  History.
In referring to the use o f the Holy Trinity as a model for personhood. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger 
writes on the Christian discovery o f what Macmurray’s had earlier described as the “kernel o f the 
concept o f person,” (1938, p. 132). Maintaining a position not very different from Macmurray's 
own, Ratzinger writes that “a person must be understood as relation...the three persons that exist 
in God are in their nature relations. They are...not substances that stand next to each other, but 
they are real existing relationships...Relationship is not something added to the person, but is the 
person itself” (quoted in Vitz, p.25) [italics in the original].
To Macmurray, as well, the “S e lf’ simply does not exist without reference to the “I."’ He 
elaborates the point in one o f his key texts.
In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our eyes inward in search o f ourselves 
we find a vacuum....It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are 
invested with significance by others who have a need o f us; and borrow our reality
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from those who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves 
but in one another, and what rights or powers or freedoms we possess are ours by the 
grace and favour o f our fellows ( 1961, p .211 ).
The grounding o f personalism in religious thought is essential to the integrity o f 
perspective. The Biblical imagery evoked is not meant for mere stylistic flair or effect. A later 
writer might point out that Macmurray is using the Bible as a meta-narrative in precisely the 
manner in which some postmodernist critics consider invalid. These concerns, and their 
pedagogical implications, are examined in Chapter Two. Macmurray’s point o f view, his 
orientation, though it may be useful to a great degree by non-theists, admittedly cannot itself be 
divorced from its religious commitment. This commitment, however, need not be formal 
membership in a Christian community. It may be satisfied quite well with a person's private 
valuing o f  Biblical humanism, of the kind espoused by Martin Buber, a Jewish writer and 
existentialist philosopher.
Revelation is a theme at work in M acmurray's writing. It operates in different ways. 
There is, firstly, the revelatory message o f Christianity as the understanding o f G od's presence 
with humankind. This is accomplished through the redeeming life and death o f his son, who 
creates a “new and everlasting covenant” between God and man. A second element o f the 
revelation is the Church’s memory' o f this event, encapsulated in its teachings as in the Roman 
Catholic understanding o f this, in its magisierhm, or teaching authority. There is also 
Macmurray’s own understanding o f revelation as that action which takes place between persons 
fully in relationship. “All knowledge of persons is by revelation. My knowledge o f you depends 
not merely on what I do, but upon what you do; and if  you refuse to reveal yourself to me, I 
cannot know you, however much I wish to do so” (1961, p. 169).
Macmurray severely criticized any attempt to emancipate the person from the context o f 
the network o f personal relationships which constitute the very being he is. The process o f 
philosophical independence absolutizes itself eventually. The philosophy it produces is like that 
found in Spinoza and Hegel. There, the ordinary person surrenders to an impersonal All, or 
Absolute, forfeiting his relationship to the rich Other, the First Person. With that rejection o f  the 
Other, o f  God, claims Macmurray, is also rejected one's dignity as a person.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
“All inspired personalists have been biblically-grounded.” wrote theologian Urs Von 
Balthasar (1986, p.20). Macmurray is no exception to Von Balthasar’s observation. In S e lf  as 
Agent he writes o f God as the universal ‘Thou,’ again in language reminiscent o f Martin Buber. 
Now the form o f religious experience involves the distinction between the first and 
second persons. The idea o f G od’ is the idea o f a universal 'T hou ' to which all 
particular persons stand in personal relation. The question o f the validity o f religious 
belief is a question o f the validity of this form. Consequently, a philosophy which 
does not formally recognize the distinction between ‘I’ and 'Y ou ' cannot even formulate 
the religious problem; and a critique o f religion is thus rendered impossible (1957, p.72). 
Macmurray also warns that an attempt to evade the moral obligation imposed upon us by 
our very nature as persons will result in some other 'T hou’ being substituted for God. We cannot 
live without an Other, and if  we cannot recognize God as that Other through our relations with 
other persons, then we will create one in our own image. The obverse o f personalism is idolatry'.
All theistic personalists agree with Macmurray that only two choices are open to the 
individual who, in the words o f Denis de Rougemont, ''tears itself away from the dark 
sacredness, from the terror o f the tribe” in search o f authentic personhood. De Rougemont adds. 
There are two possibilities: either artificially reconstruct the sacred (racism or 
communism o f the state) or accept an always urgent vocation that distinguishes the 
human being and binds him at the same time to his neighbour and founds the church.
Only in such a community does the person exist truly. Person, act, vocation become for 
me virtually synonymous. The act is concrete obedience to a transcendent vocation: 
the vocation brings forth the person in the individuum. Hence this new definition: 
the individuum  is the natural man; the person is the new creature, as (Saint) Paul 
understands it (quoted in Von Balthasar, 1986, p.25) [emphasis in original].
Macmurray joins other personalists in warning that the human tendency to separate is a 
temptation which can have but one conclusion, and that one evident since Descartes: a solipsistic 
isolation from others and from the real. In the words o f Von Balthasar, “The world situation 
today shows clearly enough that whoever discards a Christian or at least biblical view (in 
theology or philosophy) must in one way or another find in a personless collectivism or
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individualism (which converge upon one another) his downfall” (p.25). Macmurray came face- 
to-face with such a “personaless collectivism” when he realized that the Soviet experiment in 
Russian socialism, which he head supported in its initial stages, had been, with its Stalinist terror, 
corrupted into a totalitarian absolutism.
The primary demand o f religion is for a personal integrity. It provides the integration of 
the irmer life with the outer, says Macmurray. It is "a unity o f reflection and action,” a 
coincidence of motive and intention” (1961, p. 172). Working from within the embeddedness 
offered by religious or spiritual motivation correctly understood, the person as independent moral 
agent, engages in “action which is at once moral, spontaneous, and consequently, free” (1961, 
p. 183).
To be noted as well is that Macmurray believes the religious perspective to be accessible 
to all. There is no unbridgeable gulf between faith and reason. Unlike the approach o f various 
dualisms which see the religious experience as “ irrational.” Macmurray maintains that ordinaiy 
human experience provides an alternative view. Rather than being an illusion, religion and the 
spiritual are an integral part o f our humanness, and necessarily so.
The view that there is no path from common experience to a belief in God; that 
religion rests upon some special and extraordinary type o f experience apart from 
which it could not arise —  this seems to me hardly credible (1957, p. 19).
As we have seen, religion is the chief characteristic which distinguishes human beings 
from other biological life forms. Our social natures do not make us unique because there are 
many social animals. Religion is the mixture for bonding persons to each other. That is done 
through first achieving an understanding o f one’s own being.
Only in a fully personal relationship with another person do I find a response at my 
own level.... My self-consciousness is my consciousness o f myself as a person, and 
it is only possible in and through my consciousness o f a person who is not myself 
(1961,p.I33).
Macmurray maintains that self-consciousness is not a primary form o f knowledge but 
secondary. We first know the Other and if this Other is a person, then we know him as another 
agent. Then Macmurray looks at the ambiguity o f human relationships and the great threat
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presented to their ripening by the base emotion of fear:
The primary problematic o f the relation is whether he is for me or against me. But an 
agent is also a subject; and in knowing him as an agent I Imow him as a subject; and in 
knowing him as an agent I know him as a subject for whom 1 am an object. Now if I am 
in full fellowship with him...my consciousness is centered upon him and my interest 
and attention have the other as their focus. If...a constraint lies upon me in the relation.
1 fear his hostility, and am to that extent thrown on the defensive against him. The 
reflective aspect o f this is that I become self-conscious...of myself as an object which he 
may value negatively, as an object o f possible hostile criticism. He may judge me 
inferior, beneath his notice, and 1 must be ready to justify myself in his eyes. We may 
say then that self-consciousness is potential in the relation o f persons at all times, 
but becomes actual only when there is a failure o f  freedom in the relation, so that it has 
to be maintained by an effort o f will (1960, p. 160-161).
The pedagogical moments we experience as educators may all-too often be those which 
can be characterized by Macmurray's description o f this intrusive and destructive self- 
consciousness. This self-consciousness would then stand separate and apart from something far 
more constructive, say self-awareness.
One writer has said he views Macmurray’s whole project as a gloss on the idea o f love 
developed by Saint Augustine. A.R.C. Duncan argues that Freedom in the Modern World is an 
attempt “to find a philosophical expression for at least one interpretation o f the Christian 
morality o f love” (Duncan, 1990, p. 103).
The whole argument virtually amounts to a commentary on Augustine's famous advice: 
ama et fa c  quod vis, love and do as you want. The sting in both Augustine and 
Macmurray lies in the word Tove’...[N]either Augustine nor Macmurray simply says 
that everyone should do what they want...First love, then and only then, do what you 
want. Macmurray maintains that "only a real person can ever do what he pleases.'
The crux o f  his argument is the conception o f  a real person, and what it is to be a real 
person is to he understood thrnngh the concent o f friendship (p. 103).
The foundation for authentic freedom is friendship with God in obedience to his
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commands; the second great commandment, preached in all modesty and simplicity by Jesus, is 
that thou shalt love they neighbour as thyself. This would appear to bring us back into the realm 
o f compulsion to law, this time a moral one rather than a social construct. How can compulsion 
to moral obedience be a basis for freedom? Macmurray strongly objected to Kant’s categorical 
imperative, that one should never do what one could not wish to see become universally applied. 
Macmurray thought Kant’s approach too much based on rationalism. Macmurray attempted to 
extricate the divine commandments to love our fellows from notions o f service and obedience 
and the quality o f compulsion they bring with them. He argued, according to Duncan, that “we 
can achieve our own reality as persons only through entering personal relations with others”
(p. 105). It is as if God were granting us our freedom despite an innate yearning for security.
Like the Hebrew slaves o f Exodus, we are free; free even to hanker after the recently-deserted 
fleshpots o f Egypt.
One’s own personal (as it were) relationship with God is also connected with community. 
After all, if we are real only inasmuch as we are for others, then how much truer o f  our being for 
God? Macmurray encouraged the individual’s relationship with God by reminding his readers 
that its ultimate purpose is to return, spiritually enriched, to serve the community.
The individual phase o f personal relation, the necessary withdrawal into the self 
and so into solitariness, refers to the return to community and is for the sake o f that 
return. Its religious aspect must always have relation to corporate religion if  it is to 
function religiously. In formal terms, a relation with God which is not a relation 
to my neighbour is unreal. The withdrawal o f the individual into religious solitude, 
into prayer and meditation, not self-examination and self-dedication, is an affirmation 
o f his personal dependence, not an escape from it (1961, p.69-70).
With the integrity o f our personhood vouchsafed we can proceed with the great project 
mandated to us, the building o f the just society. Religious spirit may be particularized within 
smaller or larger, pluralistic or ethnic communities through time, but it is universal, and “the 
development o f religion reaches a point at which this potential inclusiveness is realized, and the 
universal religions appear” (1961, p.60). The implication o f all religious reflection, that the basis 
o f  human community is common humanity', become recognizable across cultural and religious
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barriers. It is possible to see the Other, different as he may be, in the I.
With this, religion takes on a new task —  the realization o f the unlimited community, 
the brotherhood of mankind. So religion becomes prophetic, and its reference is not to 
an actual community merely, but to the community that ought to be and is yet to be.
The universal fellowship in one common life is the correlate o f monotheism (1961,
p.60-61).
As religion involves the total person, the entire human being and not a slice o f particular 
or intimate insights to be cherished in the privacy o f one’s mind, its outcome is to be communion 
and the shared creation o f society through willed action (1961, p.47).
Macmurray was all too aware o f the importance o f  politics. Political life attempts to 
regulate forces which may hinder or assist religion’s project o f community-building. He treated 
the subject as seriously as any critical social observer does, but Macmurray knew that politics 
exists for functional purposes only. Politics is about co-operation, not friendship, as it works 
through the compelling authority of law backed by the threat o f force, police and military.
The politician must take men as they are and cannot assume that citizens are prepared to 
sacrifice their private interests for one another. Rather he must assume that all will stand 
upon their rights; and must aim at justice for all...It is certainly the case that decrease 
in fellowship in any nation must be balanced by an increase in compulsion. Political 
freedom presupposes personal community; it does not produce it. To think otherwise 
is the real utopianism of our time (1961, p.66-67) [italics in original].
S^ocietv and Community
There are two forms o f human organization: society and community. The society has a 
membership whose individual parts cooperate to achieve a common purpose. Each actor is 
dependent upon the other only to the degree that he requires his fellow’s cooperation to meet his 
own objectives. The actor cedes his freedom only to the extent that in so doing his desires are 
satisfied. The relation between individuals here are functional. Each plays his allotted part and 
this form o f social organization is “organic.” It is what Macmurray called “an organization o f 
functions” (1932, p.157-158).
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The community is organized otherwise. It is first o f all a "unity o f persons as persons."
A community will not be defined in terms o f functions or assigned roles, though these may be 
present; nor shall it be defined by any shared objectives or common purposes, though these may 
in fact be shared by the membership. Macmurray explained.
It is not organic in structure, and cannot be constituted or maintained by organization, 
but only by the motives which sustain the personal relations o f its members. It is 
constituted and maintained by mutual affection... The structure o f a community 
is the nexus or network o f the active relations o f  friendship between all possible 
pairs of its members (1932, p .158).
Macmurray did not see this portrayal o f social structure as either unrealistic or 
unattainable. He recognized that it lay at the heart o f just about every universal religion. Therein 
lies the hope. If such has been the yearning for generations o f persons, then perhaps that hope, 
grounded as it is in a vision shared by millions over many centuries, is not forlorn.
Society and community are not mutually exclusive terms with Macmurray. Society may 
be characterized as a "unity o f friendship" but its overwhelming aspect will be a functional unit)'. 
Since friendship cannot be organized, and does not express itself in a functional differentiation, 
or division o f labour, it is not likely to be found in institutions or social structures which operate 
on the assumption that such divisions are necessary to efficient and effective management. The 
equality evident in the understanding o f how members o f a community are to behave toward each 
other is not based on the equivalency or “sameness" o f persons, Macmurray warned.
It is not to say that they are equally clever, or equally strong, or equally good. Personal 
equality does not ignore the natural differences between individuals, nor their 
functional differences or capacity. It overrides them. It means that any two human 
beings, whatever their individual differences, can recognize and treat one another 
as equal, and so be friends. The alternative is a relation between an inferior and a 
superior; and such a relation excludes friendship. It is a relationship o f  master and 
servant (1949, p.51).
The need to recall a personalist interpretation o f community i<; a quite contemporary need. 
Writing in a volume o f essays on the theme o f community, Gibson Winter calls for a searching
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again o f our “root metaphors,” (Winter, 1985, p. 122). These are the essential analogies which 
have been discarded for a form o f mechanistic thinking which has availed Western society the 
marvels o f technology, but to some significant degree has also quietly sapped its moral 
imagination. Winter explains.
The indicator o f such a crisis is the failure o f mechanistic thinking to open horizons 
o f creativity in dealing with environmental, economic, international, and spiritual 
tensions. The other side o f the crisis is the tendency to regress to organicistic forms 
o f life. This is regressive because the spiritual world, the world behind the world, 
which supports the organicist world, has been eclipsed. An organicist imagery 
without such support becomes a collective will to impose a traditional order on the 
chaos that is being engendered by an outworn mechanism (p .122).
He goes on to add that root metaphors provide networks o f imagery "through which a 
people interprets and lives its foundational symbolization” (p. 122). If we take seriously W inters's 
observation that "a people dwell symbolically on earth” (p.l21), then we readily see the 
connection between this critique o f contemporary nowhereness with a Biblical imagery —  so 
important to Macmurray too —  that situates persons in their communities in a veiy concrete 
covenantal relationship with the Other, or God.
Freeing the individual —  and we recall that we use this term as a political concept, as 
opposed to the moral concept which is the word “person” —  from family and tradition requires 
socialization into the disciplines of work and bureaucratic life. Winters maintains that.
It is also the instrument for developing skills that would be useful in the industrial 
machine. Schools teach skills, but more importantly they inculcate the mood o f 
conformity to the imperious system o f  production. Freedom and individual autonomy 
were the promised goods at the end o f  the road. And for many immigrant people the 
the schools did provide a means o f upward mobility. However, for most, the dream 
turned to ashes. Schooling and work became a path to alienation and subordination 
(p.125).
In this much, at least. Macmurray. Noddings, Winter, and the postmodernists agree: 
Bureaucratized structures have long dominated most schooling in the western world. One o f the
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chief failings o f industrializing the process o f learning, according to Macmurray, is the absence 
o f a real sense o f history.
The personalist perspective suggested by Macmurray maintains that if  the ruling 
metaphor o f covenant does no replace by ideas o f production, innovation, and expediency or 
efficiency, all authentic communities will continue to suffer deeply.
The Reisers point out that “real” community is temporal as well as spiritual. "My real 
community extends backwards to my origins and forwards to my end. My origins fit within a 
past that goes back to the begirming o f my country’s history, the origins o f humanity, o f  organic 
life, to the ultimate origins o f the cosmos” (1985, p. 102). It is the personalist teacher's task to be 
aware that his covenantal responsibility to students is to nurture just this awareness, just this 
connectedness to past and future. Meanwhile, the Reisers warn against investing hierarchy with 
more authority than it deserves. Its function “should not be the means for discovering truth —  
that is, what to do and be as a group and why —  but for organizing operations" (p. 106).
That last observation recalls M acmurray's useful distinction between a "group." which 
always has utilitarian aims, and a “community,” whose purpose is for shaping friendship. “Truth 
should arise in fellowship and be implemented through hierarchy.” write the Reisers (p. 106). 
Drawing the context directly into schooling, it seems clear the function o f administration is to 
organize the operation. Goal-setting and imaging the purposes o f the school, adopting a 
curriculum, must be a deeply cooperative activity. Reiser and Reiser elaborate.
Productivity, for example, is only acceptable as long as it can be pursued while fellowship 
is sustained. While efficiency is subordinated, involvement is enhanced, maximizing 
the quality o f the goal achieved. To see hierarchy as part o f an ongoing dialogue Is 
to understand that authority finally comes from participation in the dialogue rather 
than hierarchical position, from the perceptiveness o f the questions asked and the 
fruitfulness of the answers given (p. 107).
It should be realized that the important metaphors discussed earlier (the mechanical and 
the organic) have each influenced a number o f pedagogical schemes. Even today we are able to 
classify current pédagogies, as well as older models, according to whichever metaphor o f human 
understanding informs them. The Macmurrayan model developed here is patterned on the
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personalist theme central to the Scottish moral philosopher: friendship.
By way of summary, Macmurray rejected the dualism introduced into philosophy with the 
ear o f Rene Descartes. He did not believe that there was a mind-body division that even 
warranted discussion because such a split set philosophical reflection on the wrong path. Mind 
and body are one and indivisible. Human persons are not “only” bodies, or "only” minds. They 
are both, and because o f that, they are more than the sum of their parts. The moral imperative of 
being human is that o f creating just communities o f persons using a healthy family as model. 
Finally, within the community, each person is Other-regarding when acting as a moral agent. To 
Macmurray, there can be no moral action without first reference to real, existing persons. It is 
from these real persons that one draws one’s very own being and identity.
How these key aspects o f Macmurray" s perspective o f friendship have been used as the 
basis o f a lived pedagogy was the subject o f Chapter One. There, we surveyed the experiences of 
teachers and students at Wennington School, a Quaker-sponsored residential school in Britain 
which attempted to create a learning environment informed by many of the teachings o f John 
Macmurrav.
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